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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ecosystem services literature and the theoretical models of 
ecosystem service markets have so far been based upon a few well-
studied examples—most notably New York City’s mid-1990s 
purchase and preservation of land in the Catskills watershed to meet 
its water purification goals.1  Since then, around the nation, state and 
local governments, businesses, and non-governmental organizations 
(“NGOs”) have moved beyond the theoretical and single transactions 
to develop and test a variety of ecosystem service markets.  Oregon 
environmental groups, governments, and businesses have been 
leaders in supporting and encouraging market development and 
working with regional partners interested in cooperation at larger 
scales.2  Nearby, the Puget Sound Partnership is creating a sound-
wide ecosystem restoration plan and the tools to move a restoration 
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 1. See Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the Biosphere, 391 
NATURE 629 (1998); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATERSHED MANAGEMENT FOR POTABLE 
WATER SUPPLY: ASSESSING THE NEW YORK CITY STRATEGY (2000). 
 2. The Oregon Business Plan, developed by business leaders, supports increasing the use 
of ecosystem service marketplaces.  It has helped form an Ecosystem Services Council.  See 
Oregon Business Plan: The Plan, http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/accomplishments.html 
(last visited June 4, 2010). 
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agenda forward.3  Other states and countries now are turning to 
Oregon and the Pacific Northwest to learn how they can make 
ecosystem markets work.  As Oregon remains at the forefront of 
these markets, lessons learned from Oregon’s experiments may 
provide a foundation for expanding ecosystem markets around the 
world. 
This article first describes five different types of ecosystem 
service markets in Oregon.  The article next highlights the lessons 
learned from these markets, and then discusses the potential role of 
state government in market development based on these 
observations.  The final section of the article describes Senate Bill 
513,4 a recently adopted Oregon law aimed at promoting ecosystem 
market development, and reflects on its implications for future 
market development and expansion. 
II. OREGON’S STATE-LEVEL EXPERIMENTATION 
A. Carbon Dioxide and Greenhouse Gases 
The public is more familiar with carbon markets than other 
ecosystem service markets, as President Obama and the 111th 
Congress work to pass a national cap-and-trade program5 as part of a 
global effort to limit emissions of carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs).  The cap-and-trade marketplace is 
designed as one solution to combat global climate change.  Centuries 
of industrialization and fossil fuel combustion have increased 
atmospheric GHG concentrations,6 contributing to a worldwide 
increase in global average temperatures and local climate changes.7  
People, governments, and businesses worldwide are now trying to 
curb or sequester greenhouse gas production to mitigate climate 
change. 
 
 3. See generally Puget Sound Partnership, http://www.psp.wa.gov (last visited June 4, 
2010). 
 4. S.B. 513, 75th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009). 
 5. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 11th Cong. (as passed by 
House, Jun. 26, 2009). 
 6. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL OF CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR4): CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 36 (2007) (showing 
a 70% increase of annual GHG emissions since 1970). 
 7. See id. at 38-54. 
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Many ecosystems naturally store large quantities of carbon 
dioxide in trees, soils, and biomass.8  Because storing carbon dioxide 
reduces the total amount of atmospheric carbon and its associated 
effects, this is a valuable ecosystem service even if it had never been 
historically thought of in monetary terms.  Carbon markets provide a 
way to foster the creation or preservation of nature’s credit-
sequestering services.  Carbon markets allow greenhouse gas emitters 
who may have to reduce their emissions to invest in carbon 
sequestration or to purchase offset credits from other emitters, 
allowing them to make reductions more cheaply.9 
The federal government has only recently begun to implement 
national carbon dioxide policies.10  Oregon, alongside other states, has 
long led American efforts to combat climate change.11  In 1997, 
Oregon enacted the nation’s first emission reduction standard, 
requiring new fossil-fueled power plants to reduce the emission of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) to 0.7 pounds per kilowatt-hour.
12  From the 
beginning of the reduction standard, power plant facilities were 
allowed to purchase offsets to meet these CO2-emissions goals by 
buying credits from a qualified organization or by creating projects 
themselves.13  Oregon’s Energy Facility Siting Council monitors and 
evaluates all credits and offsets, but third parties, such as those 
described below, can create them.14 
 
 8. Dennis D. Hirsch, Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the Clean 
Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 623, 629 (2007). 
 9. Id. at 627–28. 
 10. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Greenhouse Gases Threaten Public Health 
and the Environment (Dec. 7, 2009) (announcing EPA’s endangerment finding for six 
greenhouse gases). 
 11. See generally BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE & STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE 
GOVERNMENT ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Nov. 
2002), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states_greenhouse.pdf; See also 
JAMES A. ROBINSON, Note, Shaping Oregon Climate Policy in Light of the Kyoto Protocol, 21 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 207, 227–33 (2006).  The city of Portland, Oregon has also been long 
involved in targeting climate change. In 1993, it became the first city to adopt a climate strategy.  
Id.; CITY OF PORTLAND, GLOBAL WARMING REDUCTION STRATEGY (Nov. 1993), available at 
http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=41917&a=112110 (focusing on transportation, 
energy efficiency, cogeneration, recycling, and tree planting).  Portland has updated its plan, 
most recently in November 2009. CITY OF PORTLAND, CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (Sept. 2009), 
available at http://www.portlandonline.com/bps/index.cfm?c=41896 (focusing on green building, 
clean energy, green jobs, efficient urban planning, recycling, urban forests and ecosystems, local 
agriculture, and community engagement). 
 12. H.B. 3543, 74th Leg. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503 (2007); 
OR. ADMIN. R. § 345-024-0500 – 0720 (2009). 
 13. OR. REV. STAT. § 469.503. 
 14. Id. 
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1. The Climate Trust 
Adoption of the reduction standard legislation in 1997 also gave 
birth to the Climate Trust, and organization established to finance 
carbon credit projects to resell to power plants required to meet the 
state standard.15  Through 2010, the Climate Trust remains the sole 
organization qualified to generate credits for Oregon’s emissions 
program.16  Since its inception, The Climate Trust has emerged as one 
of the largest bankers of offsets in the United States with $8.8 million 
invested in a diverse portfolio of carbon reduction projects.17  This 
portfolio includes 16 projects of nine different types expected to 
offset nearly 2.8 million metric tons of carbon dioxide.18  In addition 
to investing in carbon credit projects, The Climate Trust provides 
customized offset-acquisition services for large emitters, voluntary 
programs for organizations and events, and consulting on climate 
projects, policy, and strategy.19 
Adopting the CO2 emission reduction standard as a credit driver 
and creating of The Climate Trust allowed Oregon lawmakers, 
environmental organizations, and businesses to see how an ecosystem 
service market could deliver efficient, cost-effective environmental 
results.  Several Oregon power plants have purchased mandated 
offsets and other Oregon companies have worked with The Climate 
Trust to help them voluntarily develop waste-to-energy programs.20 
2.  Ecotrust 
Ecotrust was founded in Portland, Oregon in 1991 to bring the 
best sustainability and conservation ideas from around the world to 
the United States.21  Ecotrust provides its clients consulting, capital, 
knowledge, organization, and innovation to conservation in order to 
 
 15. The Climate Trust, History, http://www.climatetrust.org/history.html (last visited June 
4, 2010). 
 16. THE CLIMATE TRUST, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at http:// 
www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/2008 Annual Report.pdf; Oregon.gov, Energy Facility Siting 
Standards, 
http://www.oregon.gov/ENERGY/SITING/standards.shtml#Carbon_Dioxide_Emissions (listing 
The Climate Trust as the only qualified organization). 
 17. See id. at 7. 
 18. The Climate Trust, Offset Portfolio, http://www.climatetrust.org/offset.html (last visited 
June 4, 2010). 
 19. The Climate Trust, Climate Services, http://www.climatetrust.org/climate_services.html 
(last visited June 4, 2010). 
 20. See THE CLIMATE TRUST, supra note 16, at 2, 4, 11. 
 21. Ecotrust, About Us, http://www.ecotrust.org/about/ (last visited June 4, 2010). 
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tackle a variety of ecological, economic, and social problems.22  As 
one of its consulting specialties, Ecotrust advises communities, tribes, 
and land managers on how they can successfully implement carbon 
offset programs to generate verifiable and salable credits.23  These 
credits allow forest owners to manage their resources to maximize 
carbon sequestration, not just timber production.24  In addition to 
consulting, Ecotrust has also taken the lead advocating for ecosystem 
service markets across the Pacific Northwest.  It helped Portland 
become the host site for the first international Katoomba conference 
on ecosystem markets held in the United States,25 and it is working 
with the Western Climate Initiative to support inclusion of forest 
carbon storage offsets in its cap-and-trade programs.26 
Ecotrust now invests directly in carbon storage with the 2004 
formation of Ecotrust Forest Management, Inc.27  This Ecotrust 
subsidiary currently manages 12,449 acres in four temperate rain 
forests.28  These forests will provide financial returns from a mixture 
of carbon credits, easements, forest waste as biofuel, non-timber 
forest products, and timber harvest, while promoting native species, 
forest health, habitat, and biodiversity.29 
B. Water Quantity 
Even before Oregon’s carbon market started in 1997, Oregon 
had experience experimenting with markets to restore streamflow for 
aquatic habitat.30  Like other Western states, Oregon allocates water 
 
 22. See id. 
 23. Ecotrust, Forest Management Planning for Carbon, Ecosystems, and Communities, 
http://www.ecotrust.org/trees/ (last visited June 4, 2010). 
 24. Ecotrust, Ecosystem Services, http://www.ecotrust.org/ecosystemservices/ (last visited 
June 4, 2010). 
 25. Ecotrust,  Portland Katoomba, http://www.ecotrust.org/katoomba/ (last visited June 4, 
2010); Katomomba Group, Making the Priceless Valuable: Jumpstarting Environmental 
Markets, http://www.katoombagroup.org/~katoomba/event_details.php?id=11 (last visited June 
4, 2010) (describing the Portland conference). 
 26. Ecotrust, Western Climate Initiative, http://www.ecotrust.org/wci/ (last visited June 4, 
2010). 
 27. Ecotrust Forest Management, Inc., http://www.ecotrustforests.com/ (last visited June 4, 
2010). 
 28. ECOTRUST FOREST MANAGEMENT, INC., FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN 9 (Mar. 2009), 
available at http://www.ecotrustforests.com/EFM_Plan_public_summary_March_2009.pdf 
 29. See generally id; ECOTRUST FOREST MANAGEMENT, INC., INVESTOR GUIDE, available 
at http://www.ecotrustforests.com/EcoForests_investor_book.pdf. 
 30. The Freshwater Trust, Why We Need a Water Trust, http:// 
www.thefreshwatertrust.org/who-we-are/about-us (last visited June 4, 2010). 
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from rivers based on the prior appropriation doctrine.31  This “first in 
time, first in right” doctrine means that earlier acquired “senior” 
water rights have priority over later “junior” rights.32  This system 
lends itself to a market, subject to numerous regulations.33  Holders of 
senior water rights may sell or transfer their right to divert water to 
others.34  In theory, this should move water to its highest economic 
use, as those who can generate more economic value from the water 
can afford to acquire senior water rights.  The private water market 
should efficiently allocate water between traditional water uses (i.e., 
agriculture, municipalities, and industry); however, water markets 
have been slow to develop even for reallocation of traditional 
consumptive water rights.35 
Oregon was one of the first states to protect instream flows36 for 
what are now called “ecosystem services,” which it did in 1955 but 
only by administrative rule.37  A more market-based approach toward 
conserving instream water was adopted with the passage of the 
Instream Water Rights Act in 1987.38  This Act formally recognized 
instream flow as a beneficial use and authorized the sale, gift, and 
leasing of existing water rights to instream uses.39  This expanded 
potential water-market participants to include conservation 
organizations that could purchase water rights to “re-water” Oregon 
creeks and streams.40  Since then, a number of innovative 
 
 31. See RICH BASTASCH, THE OREGON WATER HANDBOOK: A GUIDE TO WATER AND 
WATER MANAGEMENT 54–57 (2006 rev. ed. of WATERS OF OREGON, 1998). 
 32. See id. at 56–57; OR. WATER RES. DEP’T, AN INTRODUCTION TO WATER LAWS: 
WATER RIGHTS IN OREGON 4–7 (2008), available at www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/aquabook.pdf. 
 33. See OR. ADMIN. R. ch. 690 divs. 380 & 385; BASTACH, supra note 31, at 132–36. 
 34. See BASTASCH, supra note 31 at 132–136; OR. WATER RES. DEP’T, supra note 32, at 
29–30. 
 35. BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER 
IN CALIFORNIA (2000); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992). 
 36. For a definition and brief discussion of instream flows, see the State of Washington 
Department of Ecology’s website, http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/instream-flows/ 
isfhm.html. 
 37. See generally, Janet Neuman, Anne Squier & Gail Achterman, Symposium Article: 
Sometimes a Great Notion: Oregon's Instream Flow Experiments, 36 ENVTL. L. 1125 (2006) 
(explaining Oregon’s history of instream flow protection); Janet Neuman, Symposium Article: 
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: The First Ten Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 83 NEB. L. 
REV. 438 (2004). 
 38. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.332–360 & 455–500 (2007). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Neuman et al., supra note 37, at 1151–53. 
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organizations and programs have developed to use water markets to 
restore streamflows and the ecosystem services they provide. 
1.  Oregon Water Trust/The Fresh Water Trust 
The Oregon Water Trust (OWT) was the first water trust in the 
nation when it was founded in 1993 with the goal of restoring surface 
water flows in Oregon through science-driven, market-based, and 
cooperative solutions.41  To reach these goals, OWT focuses on 
purchasing or leasing water rights in small tributary streams where 
small amounts of water provide significant ecological benefits.42  They 
also work to help farmers and other water users improve their 
efficiency through water conservation and then convert the “saved” 
water into increased instream water rights.43  Through these 
mechanisms, The OWT/Freshwater Trust’s portfolio of water rights is 
now more than 150 cubic feet per second (cfs; 100 million gallons per 
day).44 
2.  Deschutes River Conservancy 
The Deschutes River Conservancy (“the DRC”) works to 
improve water quality and streamflow in the Deschutes Basin of 
Central Oregon.45  It was created in 1996 by the Confederated Tribes 
of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, several local irrigation 
districts, and environmental organizations. It is authorized to receive 
federal funding for watershed restoration.46  The DRC operates much 
 
 41. See generally id.; Mary Ann King, Getting Our Feet Wet: An Introduction to Water 
Trusts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 496 (2004); Lynne Marie Paretchan, Choreographing NGO 
Strategies to Protect Instream Flows, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 33 (2002); The Freshwater Trust, 
supra note 30.  OWT recently merged with Oregon Trout to become The Freshwater Trust, but 
it continues to operate a simlar focus and mission.  The Freshwater Trust, http:// 
www.thefreshwatertrust.org/conservation/stream-flow/approach (last visited June 5, 2010).  This 
paper will use the abbrevition OWT to refer to both the previous Oregon Water Trust and the 
newly renamed The Freshwater Trust. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Neuman, supra note 37, at 444–45. 
 44. The Freshwater Trust, From the Trust, 1 FRESHWATER 30 (Fall 2009). 
 45. Deschutes River Conservancy, About Us, http://www.deschutesriver.org/About_Us/ 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2010); Oregon Resource Conservation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 
301(b)(3), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to pay "up to 50 
percent" of the cost of approved projects) (reauthorized by the Deschutes Resources 
Conservancy Reauthorization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-270, 114 Stat. 791 (2000)).  These 
matching sources include corporate, foundation, and individual funding, state and federal 
agencies, as well as the development of fee-for-service enterprises.  About the Deschutes 
Resources Conservancy, http://www.deschutesrc.org/about/about.htm (last accessed Mar. 24, 
2004) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
 46. Deschutes River Conservancy, supra note 45. 
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like other water trusts by acquiring water through conservation 
projects, water leases, and water rights purchases.  One type of 
conservation project is the piping and lining of irrigation ditches.47  
DRC’s lining projects help reduce the excessive seepage and 
evaporation losses from diverted irrigation water in unlined ditches.  
The DRC piping and lining projects resulted in 54 cfs  (35 million 
gallons per day) of permanent instream flow restoration.48  Moreover, 
the DRC is active in water leasing, which allows water owners to 
continue “beneficially using” water rights they are not presently using 
for irrigation by leasing them to the DRC for instream purposes.49  
The DRC also purchases water rights outright and accepts donations 
of water rights that are no longer needed by their current owners.50  
Both the owned and leased water is returned to instream usage to 
restore instream flows for a season or permanently.51 
Beyond acquiring water rights to increase instream flow, the 
DRC collaborates with Deschutes basin water users52 through the 
Deschutes Water Alliance Water Bank and Groundwater Mitigation 
Bank53 to provide mitigation credits needed by cities, real estate 
developers, and others to offset new groundwater withdrawals.  
Under state law, new groundwater permit applicants in the Deschutes 
 
 47. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Conservation, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Conservation (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Leasing, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Leasing (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).  It is 
important to landowners to be legally seen as “beneficially using” their water rights so they do 
not risk forfeiting them.  OR. REV. STAT. § 536.310(1); BASTASCH, supra note 31, 59–60. 
 50. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Transfers, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
What_We_Do/Streamflow_Restoration/Water_Transfers (last visited June 4, 2010). 
 51. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Leasing, supra note 49. 
 52. The current members of the Deschutes Water Alliance are the Deschutes River 
Conservancy, Central Oregon Irrigation District, Swalley Irrigation District, City of Bend, City 
of Redmond, and Avion Water Company.  Deschutes River Conservancy, Deschtes Water 
Alliance, 
http://www.deschutesriver.org/What_We_Do/Partnerships/Deschutes_Water_Alliance/default.a
spx (last visited May 10, 2010).  The Water Alliance Water Bank also acquires water rights 
permanently and temporarily from irrigation districts for instream purposes apart from the 
groundwater mitigation program in order to preserve agricultural water rights and contribute to 
streamflow restoration.  DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE, WATER BANK: BALANCING WATER 
DEMAND IN THE DESCHUTES BASIN 1 (2008), http://www.deschutesriver.org/CEDocuments/ 
Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=323478&fd=0 (last visited June 4, 2010). 
 53. Deschutes River Conservancy, Water Banking, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
What_We_Do/ Water_Banking/Water_Bank/ (last visited June 10, 2010). 
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Basin must acquire mitigation credits54 to “offset the potential 
interference with hydraulically connected surface waters caused by 
ground water withdrawals within the Deschutes River Basin.”55  The 
program was recently evaluated, demonstrating its overall 
contribution to streamflow restoration.56  The DRC administers these 
water banks in cooperation with local irrigation districts, 
municipalities, landowners, and the Oregon Water Resources 
Department.57 
The net result is that the DRC and the water banks have made 
significant headway in meeting the Oregon Department of Fish and 
Wildlife’s targets for stream flow on several priority creeks and rivers.  
For instance, Whychus Creek historically dried up every summer, but 
saw summer flows of 15 cfs in 2007, nearly meeting the 20 cfs target.58  
In the Middle Deschutes River, south of Bend, Oregon, the DRC’s 
cooperative approach has raised flows from the historic low level of 
30 cfs to 115 cfs in 2008, bringing it almost halfway to the 250 cfs 
target.59 
3.  Columbia Basin Water Transaction Program 
The Northwest Power and Conservation Council (the “Council”) 
developed a comprehensive Fish and Wildlife Program beginning in 
1982 under the Northwest Power Act.60  In spite of its call for instream 
flow restoration in the Columbia River Basin, very little water was 
 
 54. H.B. 2184, § 2 (Or. 2001) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 537.746 (2007)); see also H.B. 
3494 (Or. 2005). 
 55. Id. § 2; see also, Martha O. Pagel, Creative Programs and Projects to Increas Water 
Supply Mitigation and Mitigation Banking: Strategies for Meeting New Supply Needs in Oregon’s 
Deschutes Basin, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 29 (2002-2003) (describing the development of the 
regulatory program). 
 56. See OR. WATER RESOURCES DEP’T, DESCHUTES GROUNDWATER MITIGATION: 
PROGRAM FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM EVALUATION REPORT (2008), available at http:/ 
www1.wrd.state.or.us/pdfs/Deschutes_Mitigation_5_Year_Review_Final_Report.pdf. 
 57. See DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE, DESCHUTES WATER ALLIANCE WATER BANK: 
BALANCING WATER DEMAND IN THE DESCHUTES BASIN (2008), http:// 
www.deschutesriver.org/CEDocuments/Downloads_GetFile.aspx?id=323478&fd=0 (last visited 
June 5, 2010). 
 58. Deschutes River Conservancy, Whychus Creek, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
Our_Basin/Upper_Deschutes/Whychus_Creek/default.aspx (last visited June 4, 2010). 
 59. See Deschutes River Conservancy, Middle Deschutes River http:// 
www.deschutesriver.org/Our_Basin/Upper_Deschutes/Middle_Deschutes/default.aspx (last 
visited June 4, 2010). 
 60. See Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program Introduction, http:// 
www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-20/default.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2010); see also, 
MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE 
DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON (2002). 
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acquired for the first 20 years of the program, even after many 
Columbia Basin salmon were listed under the Endangered Species 
Act.61  Recognizing the lack of success in streamflow restoration, in 
2000, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Biological Opinion on 
operation of the federal Columbia River hydroelectric system 
specifically required the Bonneville Power Administration (“BPA”) 
to increase tributary flows by experimenting with transactional 
strategies and competitive markets.62 
In response, BPA and the Council formed the Columbia Basin 
Water Transfer Program (“CBWTP”) in 2002, which has successfully 
implemented a variety of innovative, voluntary, grassroots water 
transactions that improve river, stream, and tributary flow.63  The 
program, managed by the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 
receives transaction proposals and then evaluates and ranks them 
across several criteria.64  These projects come from specific 
“qualified” local entities and eleven partner organizations working 
throughout the Columbia Basin in Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and 
Washington.65  The CBWTP has funded over 227 water restoration 
projects to date.66 
4.  Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust 
The mission of the Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust (“KBRT”) is 
to restore and conserve water quality and quantity in Oregon’s Wood 
 
 61. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON THE REINITIATION OF 
CONSULTATION 
ON OPERATION OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM, INCLUDING THE 
JUVENILE FISH 
TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM, AND 19 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION PROJECTS IN THE 
COLUMBIA BASIN (2000). 
 62. Id. at 9-134. 
 63. Columbia Basin Water Transactions, The Program, http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/ 
program.jsp (last visited June 4, 2010). 
 64. See Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Criteria for Evaluating Proposals to 
Secure Tributary Water, http://www.cbwtp.org/partners/Criteria_02_12_04.htm (last visited June 
4, 2010). 
 65. Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Partners, http://www.cbwtp.org/ 
jsp/cbwtp/program/ partners.jsp (last visited June 4, 2010).  Also, the Deschutes River 
Conservancy and the Freshwater Trust are qualified local entities participating in the CBWTP. 
 66. JARED HARDNER & R.E. GULLISON, INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE 
COLUMBIA BASIN WATER TRANSACTIONS PROGRAM (2003-2006) 10 (Oct. 2007), available at 
http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/program/2008amend/cbwtp.pdf (listing 153 water projects from 
2003-2006); Nat’l Fish and Wildlife Found., Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, 
http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/query/select_fields.jsp (last visited May 13, 2010) (running 
query creates database showing 246 water restoration projects). 
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River Valley and the upper Klamath Basin.67  This organization has 
specific goals of reducing cattle grazing to sustainable levels, 
increasing flow into the Upper Klamath Lake, and reestablishing 
specific wetlands in the area above the lake.68  KBRT works with 13 
landowners in the Wood River Valley to pilot land-and-water-
management projects involving over 12,200 acres of rangeland.69  
Irrigation rights associated with the participating ranches are acquired 
and left instream. This significantly increases flows in Crooked Creek, 
the Wood River, Sevenmile Creek, and Fourmile Creek, to benefit 
of a variety of endangered, threatened, and aquatic species.70  
Livestock herds on the participating properties were reduced by 80 
percent relative to historic levels.71  Increased flows to Upper 
Klamath-Agency Lake also provide additional water to meet the 
demands of downstream fish, wildlife, and farming communities.72  
The KBRT projects also provides significant water quality benefits 
and a 30 percent increase of flow into the Wood River Valley and 
Agency Lake.73  The water left instream showed improvements in 
quality—lower temperatures and reduced nutrient loads—and 
riparian fencing allowed important riparian vegetation to 
reestablish.74   The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and the Natural 
Resource Conservation Service fund the landowner’s water 
acquisitions and water quality improvement practices directly based 
upon the ecosystem services the landowners provide.75 
5.  Bonneville Environmental Foundation 
Regulation is not the only factor motivating purchasers of water 
restoration credits.  Individuals are often concerned about the impact 
of their water use on the ecological health of their watershed.  Some 
refer to this as a desire to be “water neutral.”  Extracting water 
 
 67. Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust, Mission Statement, http://www.kbrt.org (last visited 
June 4, 2010). 
 68. Id. 
 69. KLAMATH BASIN RANGELAND TRUST, 2005 YEAR-IN-REVIEW 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.kbrt.org/Files/KBRT%202005%20Year%20in%20Review.pdf. 
 70. Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust, Year 2-2003 Projects, http://www.kbrt.org/ 
Page.asp?NavID=116 (last visited June 5, 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. KLAMATH BASIN RANGELAND TRUST,  2006 YEAR-IN –REVIEW  2 (2007), available at 
http://www.kbrt.org/Files/KBRT_Year-In-Review_2006%5B1%5D.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. Klamation Basin Rangeland Trust, supra note 71. 
 75. See King, supra note 41 at 528 & n.159. 
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neutrally means that its “negative economic, social, and 
environmental externalities . . . are reduced as much as possible and 
that the remaining impacts are fully compensated.”76  The Bonneville 
Environmental Foundation (“BEF”) now provides resources to help 
residential and commercial water users reduce their water use 
footprints77 and develop water conservation and stewardship plans.78  
For water uses that users cannot reduce, BEF sells Water Restoration 
Certificates.79  These certificates are designed to allow residents to 
take responsibility for their water consumption by paying BEF to 
assure that an equivalent amount of water is returned to the 
watershed.80  Each certificate represents 1000 gallons of streamflow 
restoration and costs one dollar.81  In Oregon, BEF uses the money 
generated from selling these certificates to purchase restoration 
credits from the Deschutes River Conservancy and The Freshwater 
Trust for streamflow and watershed restoration in the Middle 
Deschutes River and Evan’s Creek.82  The National Fish and Wildlife 
Federation independently certifies these credits.83 
C. Water Quality 
In the United States, water quality is primarily addressed 
through the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).84  The Act’s regulatory focus 
is on discharges from point-source conveyances into navigable 
waterways.85  The program, known as the National Pollutant 
 
 76. BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., THE ROLE OF VOLUNTARY AND MARKET-BASED 
INITIATIVES IN FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION 9 (2009), available at http://www.b-e-
f.org/lib/pdf/BAFInal.pdf (quoting ARJEN HOEKSTRA, WATER NEUTRAL: REDUCING AND 
OFFSETTING THE IMPACTS OF WATER FOOTPRINTS 5 (UNESCO-IHE, 2008)). 
 77. Bonneville Envtl Found., Renewable Energy, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/action (last 
visited June 6, 2010). 
 78. See BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., WATER STEWARDSHIP 101, 3–7 (2009), available at 
http://www.b-e-f.org/lib/pdf/BusinessWaterStewardship.pdf. 
 79. Bonneville Envtl Found., Introducing BEF Water Restoration Certificates, http:// 
www.b-e-f.org/blog/?p=1256 (last visited June 8, 2010). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Bonneville Envtl Found., Buying Blue Will Help Keep You Green, http://www.b-e-
f.org/water/buy (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 82. See Bonneville Envtl Found., Where the Healing is Happening, http://www.b-e-
f.org/water/locations (last visited June 6, 2010); Bonneville Envtl Found., Middle Deschutes 
River, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/location/middle_deschutes (last visited June 6, 2010); 
Bonneville Envtl Found., Evans Creek, http://www.b-e-f.org/water/location/evans_creek (last 
visited June 6, 2010). 
 83. BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., supra note 76, at 9. 
 84. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304, 347 (1981). 
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
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Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), requires all dischargers to 
meet uniform technology standards mandated by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).86 
During the early years of CWA implementation, the technology-
forcing requirements of NPDES permits were the EPA’s focus.  
Water-quality standards were regarded as a safety net, in case 
technology-based effluent standards in permits were not sufficient to 
achieve designated beneficial uses.  During the 1980s and 1990s states 
began to identify waters where technology-based pollution controls 
were insufficient to achieve the water bodies’ designated uses.  This 
requires development of Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) 
allocations under the Clean Water Act § 303(d).87  Once TMDLs are 
adopted, NPDES permits must include more stringent limits to 
ensure compliance with water quality.88 
However, in many cases, the reason water quality standards are 
not met is due to agricultural and urban runoff and other non-point 
sources of pollutants, which do not require NPDES permits.89  Critics 
note that trying to achieve needed pollution reductions solely through 
NPDES permit conditions does not improve water quality 
efficiently.90  Within one watershed different polluters may be able to 
reduce their discharges of a particular pollutant for very different 
costs.  If affordable pollution reduction were the CWA’s primary 
goal, facilities with a higher marginal cost of pollution reduction could 
easily purchase the lowest cost reductions in the watershed, no matter 
the source. 
Realizing the lack of flexibility inherent in the traditional 
regulatory program, the EPA issued a “Draft Framework for 
Watershed-Based Trading”91 in 1996.  The EPA supplemented this 
framework in 2003 with a “Water Quality Trading Policy”92 aimed at 
reducing states’ costs of implementing TMDL requirements and 
 
 86. Id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b), 1316. 
 87. Id. at 589, 684-85. 
 88. Id. at 661, 665; 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). 
 89. Id. at 685. 
 90. Id. at  647. 
 91. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED 
TRADING, EPA 800-R-96-001 (May 1996). 
 92. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY (2003), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/finalpolicy2003.pdf. 
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allowing facilities discharging into the same waters to generate and 
trade credits.93 
1.  Clean Water Services 
Clean Water Services (“CWS”) is the water resources 
management agency for Washington County, Oregon, serving cities 
and towns west of Portland.94  CWS received the first-ever fully 
integrated municipal NPDES permit on February 26, 2004.95  Five 
permits—four wastewater treatment facilities and one urban 
stormwater management permit—were combined into one permit in 
a comprehensive approach to achieve water quality standards and to 
improve the overall health of the Tualatin River watershed.96  The 
new permit allowed trading of water quality credits based on 
temperature (thermal load), oxygen-demanding chemicals, and other 
pollutants to help achieve water quality goals.97  The goal of such 
trading is to allow “1) greater coordination of watershed protection 
and enhancement programs; 2) greater coordination of watershed 
assessment and monitoring activities; and 3) greater public 
involvement.”98  The trades do not have to rely on credits generated 
by the permitted facilities; for instance, to meet temperature goals, a 
treatment facility may balance the heat it releases by planting new 
trees in rural riparian areas which provide cooling shade.99  The CWS 
permit epitomizes the promise of ecosystem service markets.  The 
agency would have had to refrigerate its wastewater discharges to 
meet the instream temperature standard.  By investing in riparian 
restoration, the agency saved money, reduced energy use and 
achieved habitat restoration co-benefits.100 
 
 93. Id. at 6–7. 
 94. Clean Water Serv., Your Clean Water Utility, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/ 
AboutUs/OurStory (last visited June 7, 2010). 
 95. INST. FOR NATURAL RES., POLICY CORNERSTONES AND ACTION STRATEGIES FOR AN 
INTEGRATED ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE IN OREGON 6 (2008). 
 96. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION 
SYSTEM WATERSHED-BASED WASTE DISCHARGE PERMIT, Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 
101144 & MS4, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdescan/OR0028118FP.pdf. 
 97. Id. at 42–45. 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 99. Id. at 27–28. 
 100. See ERNIE NIEMI, KRISTIN LEE, & TATIANA RATERMAN, NET ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
OF USING ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION TO MEET STREAM TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS 2–3 
(2007), available at http://www.econw.com/reports/Economic-Benefits-Ecosystem-
Restoration_ECONorthwest.pdf. 
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The successes of CWS helped set the stage for further focus on 
water quality trading.  In 2007, the EPA issued its own water quality 
“trading toolkit” manual explaining how to design and implement 
water quality trading schemes.101  The Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality (“ODEQ”) has also proposed new guidance 
to encourage and expand water quality trading.102  Because warm 
streams are a limiting factor for salmon recovery, ODEQ has also 
created the “Shade-a-Lator” worksheet.  This calculates temperature 
credits generated by riparian shade restoration, allowing sellers of 
ecosystem services to create tradable temperature credits at lower 
costs.103 
D. Land Banking for Wetlands and Habitat 
Land development over centuries has significantly reduced fish 
and wildlife habitat.  Traditional land trusts, like The Nature 
Conservancy, pioneered the practice of acquiring land to protect its 
biodiversity value.  Two federal statutes touch directly upon 
ecologically valuable lands: wetlands are governed by CWA and its 
regulations,104 and modification to some terrestrial habitats are 
protected under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).105  In response 
to the costly restrictions these acts can impose, markets for mitigation 
credits have begun to develop.  These markets—or banks—sell 
credits to developers to mitigate for the impacts their projects have 
on wetlands or endangered species habitat.  This type of land banking 
attempts to convert ecological functions to a tradable currency, so 
that restoration in one area can generate mitigation credits that can 
be applied to other locations or sold to developers. 
 
 101. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATER QUALITY TRADING TOOLKIT FOR PERMIT 
WRITERS (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/wqtradingtoolkit.pdf.  The toolkit 
and its suppliment cite Clean Water Services’ pollutant trading scheme as a model example 
several times. 
 102. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY TRADING IN NPDES PERMITS 
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 13–14  (2009), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/ 
WQ/pubs/imds/wqtrading.pdf. 
 103. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality Trading, http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/ 
trading/trading.htm (last visited June 6, 2010); Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, Water Quality: 
Temperature, 
willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/water-quality-temperature (last visited 
June 6, 2010). 
 104. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006); 40 C.F.R. §§ 230, 232 (2009). 
 105. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2006). 
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1.  Wetlands Mitigation Banking 
Wetlands provide many services to humans, including water 
retention, soil formation, recreation, erosion control, nutrient cycling, 
pollination of crops, and endangered species habitat.  In the 
continental United States, more than half of the historically existing 
wetlands have been drained, filled, or destroyed by agriculture, urban 
and rural development, and river and flood control projects.106  
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act authorizes the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (“the Corps”) to issue permits allowing wetland filling.107  
Since 1990, the EPA and the Corps have required “no net loss” of 
wetland acreage.108  To meet this goal, developers are required to first 
avoid filling wetlands and then to minimize its effects.  Only 
unavoidable effects can be mitigated through wetland restoration in 
the area.109  After limited success through project-by-project, on-site 
compensatory mitigation, in 1995 the federal agencies began allowing 
banking of wetlands mitigation credits.110  These regulations under 
section 404(b)(1) allow for “compensatory mitigation to offset 
unavoidable damage to wetlands and other aquatic resources.”111  This 
guidance gave state agencies, local governments, and the private 
sector the regulatory certainty and procedural framework they 
needed to approve and operate mitigation banks.112 
Trading in wetlands banks soon became robust, making wetland 
banks the most mature form of habitat banking.  In wetland 
mitigation banks, by restoring the values of a wetland, the landowner 
generates credits that they can sell to developers who need to offset 
unavoidable wetland impacts.113  But these trades often rely on safe 
havens based on simple acre-to-acre mitigation ratios that ignore 
preserving the functions that make wetlands valuable.114  While 
 
 106. PAUL F. SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 
10–13 (1997). 
 107. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 108. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONCERNING 
THE DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1) 
GUIDELINES  § IIIB (1990). 
 109. Id at § II C. 
 110. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 
60 Fed. Reg. 58605 (Nov. 28, 1995). 
 111. Id. at 58606. 
 112. Id. at 58605–14. 
 113. See id at 58606.. 
 114. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES 
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 138-68 (2001) (analyzing strengths and weaknesses of ongoing 
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wetlands provide a variety of ecological services, the early use of 
wetland markets relied upon very few of these.115 
The EPA and the Corps have the authority to allow the 
exchange and banking of wetlands services, rather than mere 
acreages.116  In 2008, EPA and the Corps issued revised regulations 
governing compensatory mitigation.117  These regulations establish 
standards for mitigation banks, in-lieu fee mitigation, and permittee-
responsible mitigation.118 
Oregon’s Department of State Lands (“ODSL”) issues fill and 
removal permits for wetlands under state law.119  The Corps 
administers the federal 404 program in Oregon, but in many cases the 
agencies operate cooperatively.120  ODSL adopted guidelines similar 
to the federal guidelines in 1996.121  The Corps and ODSL oversee 
bank plans and release credits to wetlands bankers only after bank 
owners meet performance measures and arrange to fund, maintain, 
manage, and monitor the wetlands in perpetuity.122  ODSL encourages 
potential bank owners to establish mitigation banks in watersheds 
where there is a large amount of development activity, “so that it is 
positioned to provide ‘in-kind’ mitigation for these anticipated 
wetland impacts.”123  Such preferred bank sites assure that bank 
owners are preserving wetlands of the same type, function, and 
service area as those in the path of development in the region.  Good 
locations for banks are sites adjacent or close to other protected 
natural-habitat areas such as refuges, river corridors, and floodplains 
 
mitigation projects and recommending, inter alia, a watershed approach, focusing on ecological 
performance criteria, better accounting for temporal lags and long term obligations); James 
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 607, 665-66 (2000). 
 115. Id. at 612. 
 116. See J.B.  Ruhl & R. Juge  Gregg, Integrating  Ecosystem Services into Environmental 
Law: A Case Study of  Wetland Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 372–78 (2001) 
(finding that CWA § 404 and subsequent regulations and guidelines all provide ample authority 
and encouragement for considering ecosystem services but fail to require it). 
 117. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19594 (April 
10, 2008). 
 118. See id. 
 119. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 196.600–692., 196.800–990. 
 120. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Oregon Removal-Fill Program, http://www.oregon.gov/ 
DSL/PERMITS/r-fintro.shtml (last visited June 8, 2010). 
 121. OR. ADMIN. R. 141-085-0680–0760 (2010). 
 122. See MITIGATION BANKING GUIDEBOOK COMM., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 
GUIDEBOOK FOR OREGON § 4.4 – 5 (2000), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/ 
docs/mitbank_guidebk.pdf. 
 123. Id. at § 2.4. 
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where they will create the least conflict with existing uses.124  Oregon 
currently has 15 approved wetland mitigation banks,125 with an 
additional seven proposed banks under review.126 
2.  Oregon Bridge Program Comprehensive Mitigation and 
Conservation Strategy 
Roads and highways shape our communities and link us together; 
however, they slice natural systems into pieces, destroying habitat and 
disrupting a wide array of ecosystem services.127  State departments of 
transportation must comply with a wide variety of environmental laws 
and regulations when they build, maintain and operate state highway 
systems.  Since at least 1990, the Oregon Department of 
Transportation (“ODOT”) has tried to streamline highway project 
permitting and reduce costs while effectively mitigating unavoidable 
wetland impacts, facilitating priority ecological restoration and 
species recovery, creating ecologically sound and sustainable 
mitigation, and conserving resources.128 
From 2001 to 2003, ODOT realized that hundreds of its concrete 
bridges had developed cracks, requiring them to be replaced or 
repaired.129  This resulted in the $1.3 billion Bridge Delivery 
Program.130  Upgrading and repairing 300 bridges in eight years131 
requires permits under the Endangered Species Act,132 the Clean 
 
 124. OR. ADMIN. R. 141-085-0565 (2010). 
 125. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Mitigation Bank Regions and Contact Information, 
http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/mitbank_status.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See generally RICHARD T.T. FORMAN ET AL, ROAD ECOLOGY: SCIENCE AND 
SOLUTIONS (2003); DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, GETTING UP TO SPEED: A CONSERVATIONIST’S 
GUIDE TO WILDLIFE AND HIGHWAYS (2007). 
 128. LISA GAINES & SUSAN LURIE, INNOVATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING 
AND PROJECT DELIVERY: THE OREGON STATE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM 3, 27, SR 500-
151 (2007), available at http://www.inr.oregonstate.edu/download/Streamlining_Jan07.pdf 
(briefly discussing Oregon’s Comprehensive Environmental and Transportation Agreement on 
Streamlining, an 11-state-and-federal-agency program designed to streamline NEPA review); 
see also CONNIE OZAWA & JENNIFER DILL, AN EVALUATION OF THE OREGON DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION'S (ODOT) ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING EFFORTS: A FOCUS ON 
CETAS (2005). 
 129. See GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 11. 
 130. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONTEXT SENSITIVE AND SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS (CS3) 
GUIDEBOOK: COMMUNITY VALUES SHAPING A NEW GENERATION OF BRIDGES 2 (2005), 
available at http://www.obdp.org/files/partner/cs3/cs3-guidebook.pdf. 
 131. Or. Dep’t of Transp., OTIA III State Bridge Delivery Program, http://egov.oregon.gov/ 
ODOT/HWY/OTIA/odotbridgesee_regs.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 132. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. 
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Water Act,133 and compliance with the National Environmental Policy 
Act.134  This project put the agency’s prior work on permit 
streamlining to the test.  ODOT and the regulatory agencies realized 
that business as usual would not work. 
To speed up permitting and improve environmental outcomes, 
ODOT developed a “comprehensive mitigation-banking program” to 
provide mitigation credits for unavoidable construction impacts.135  To 
minimize impacts first, ODOT developed a set of environmental 
performance standards addressing species and habitat avoidance, 
water quality, and site restoration.136  For unavoidable impacts, most 
mitigation programs explicitly prefer on-site mitigation, even though 
such mitigation is often difficult to develop, expensive, and may be of 
little long-term ecological value.137  In this case, however, the 
Mitigation and Conservation Bank Review Team (“MCBRT”), made 
up of representatives from eight state and federal agencies,138 instead 
decides where mitigation will be most effective on a site-by-site 
basis.139 
Unlike many wetland banking programs based on pure acre-for-
acre “no net loss” mitigation, the MCBRT targets the recovery of 
ecosystems and lost habitat functions.140  The programmatic Biological 
Opinion issued to ODOT in 2004 for the Bridge Program explains 
how ODOT plans to use “habitat banking concepts” in habitat 
management areas.141  Development approval relies upon on a “multi-
 
 133. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
 135. Or. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 131. 
 136. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 19–20, app. A-2; OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OTIA III 
STATE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 14–30 
(2005), available at http://www.obdp.org/files/partner/environmental/EPS_REG.pdf. 
 137. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 894–96, 895 n.17 
(1997). 
 138. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 31. 
 139. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AND TRANSPORTATION 
AGREEMENT FOR STREAMLINING: PROGRESS REPORT—AUGUST 2007 TO AUGUST 2008 
APPROVED WORK PLAN—SEPTEMBER 2008 TO SEPTEMBER 2010, at 21 (2008), available at 
ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/Geo-
Environmental/Environmental/Other Enviromental Materials/CETAS/Annual Reports and Wo
rk Plans/2008_2010_Workplan/CETAS_2008-2010_Work_Plan_AdoptedFinal.pdf. 
 140. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 130, at 52; GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 20. 
 141. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA 
FISHERIES NWR 2004/00209 & USFWS FILE #8330.02233 (04), ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT—
SECTION 7 CONSULTATION, INFORMAL CONCURRENCE AND FORMAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION 
AND CONFERENCE & MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT 
ACT: ESSENTIAL FISH HABITAT CONSULTATION, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF 
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resource mitigation debit and credit system.”142  Prioritization of 
ecosystem conservation needs helped identify regionally significant 
mitigation alternatives that contribute most to the recovery of 
habitats and species.  ODOT has been able to achieve cost-effective 
and ecologically meaningful mitigation by addressing these needs at 
ODOT bank sites.143  “The Habitat Accounting Method helps to 
accurately measure ecological functions providing better accounting 
of impacts and restoration efforts.”144  The MCBRT has established 
three banks for wetlands and endangered species habitat in the Lost 
River, Crooked River, and Medford Vernal Pools in the Agate 
Desert.145  It has also identified two other potential bank locations in 
Mirror Lake and East Fork Minnow Creek.146 
An independent evaluation of ODOT’s use of wetlands and 
habitat banks, as well as outcome-based performance measures, in 
the Bridge Program concluded that it led to a 3:1 return on 
investment for the agency, in addition to improved environmental 
outcomes.147 
E. Integrated Ecosystem Services Marketplace 
The goal of building an integrated ecosystem marketplace is to 
attain broader and more effective conservation and restoration, 
rather than the fragmented permit-by-permit approach required by 
existing laws and regulations requiring separate credits for carbon, 
streamflow, water quality and habitat.  Integrated market 
development will require a new suite of tools tied to strategic 
ecological priorities and market-based incentives.  The thesis is that 
 
TRANSPORTATION’S OTIA III STATEWIDE BRIDGE DELIVERY PROGRAM 36 (Jun. 28, 2004), 
available at ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/Geo-
Environmental/Environmental/Regulatory%20Documentation%20Forms%20and%20Example
s/Biology/Programmatic%20Biological%20Opinions/OTIA%20III%20Bridge%20Replacemen
t%20Biological%20Assessment/Biological%20Opinion.pdf. 
 142. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 20–21. 
 143. Id. at 44–46. 
 144. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Oregon's Ecosystem-Based Approach to Mitigation and 
Conservation Banking, http://www.environment.fhwa.dot.gov/ecosystems/eei/or06.asp (last 
visited May 18, 2010). 
 145. Id; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Oregon’s First Conservation Bank, http://www.fws.gov/ 
oregonFWO/LandAndWater/ConservationPlanning/ConservationBank.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 
2010). 
 146. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 139, at 23–24. 
 147. OR. DEP’T OF TRANS., ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMATIC PERMITTING 
BENEFIT/COST ANALYSIS (Oct. 2008) (on file with the authors). 
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the more readily ecological services can be assessed, the more readily 
they can be valued and protected. 
1.  Willamette Partnership 
In addition to the individual Oregon resource programs 
described above, the Willamette Partnership is working to build the 
infrastructure to operate an integrated, multi-credit market that will 
create and sell credits for a wide range of ecosystem services.148  The 
Willamette Partnership is a broad-based coalition of stakeholders 
committed to restoring the health of the ecologically, socially, and 
economically complex Willamette Valley.  This 11,500 square mile 
watershed contains the cities of Portland, Eugene, Salem, and 
Corvallis, 2.5 million people, and 75 percent of Oregon’s economic 
activity.149 The Willamette Partnership recognized the need for a 
coordinated approach that focuses public and private investments on 
strategic actions that support ecosystem-based improvements.  To 
address this need, it launched the “Counting on the Environment” 
program with Natural Resource and Conservation Service funding.150  
The program seeks to encourage participation in market-based 
conservation efforts by developing model agreements with federal, 
state, and local agencies; user-friendly resource calculating tools151; 
multiple-credit accounting systems; and understandable crediting 
protocols.152  These systems are designed to provide the infrastructure 
needed to support multi-resource credit sales.  The ecosystem service 
markets developed so far support four credit types—salmonid 
habitat, wetlands, upland prairies, and riparian shading (temperature 
 
 148. See Willamette P’ship, The Willamette Partnership, http:// 
www.willamettepartnership.org (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 149. Willamette P’ship, About the Willamette Basin, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
about-the-willamette-basin (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 150. Nat. Resources Conservation Serv., Conservation Innovation Grants Awards—
National Component Awards—Fiscal Year 2007 (NRCS), available at http:// 
www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/pdf_files/FY_2007_Conservation_Innovation_Grants_Projects.pdf
; Willamette P’ship, Counting on the Environment, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
ongoing-projects-and-activities/nrcs-conservation-innovations-grant-1/counting-on-the-environ
ment (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 151. Willamette P’ship, Ecosystem Credit Accounting, http://willamettepartnership.org/ 
ecosystem-credit-accounting (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); Willamette P’ship, Protocols, Tools and 
Templates, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/tools-templates (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). 
 152. See generally, WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ECOSYSTEM CREDIT ACCOUNTING: PILOT 
GENERAL CREDITING PROTOCOL: WILLAMETTE BASIN VERSION 1.1 (2009), available at http:// 
willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/willamette-ecosystem-marketplace-
documents/General%20Crediting%20Protocol%207.20.09.pdf. 
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credits)—with more credits to be developed later.153  The Willamette 
Partnership expects these tools to improve the ecological 
effectiveness of mitigation expenditures from factories, developers, 
transportation agencies, cities, and sewer and water ratepayers.154  The 
current lack of well-organized markets also inhibits the conservation 
options for farmers, ranchers, and landowners.  With a functioning 
market for services, they could provide additional ecosystem services 
on their lands, diversifying and increasing their incomes through 
conservation investments.  Because it is integrated and will involve 
many types of credits—and many types of buyers and sellers—this 
developing ecosystem marketplace should expect to create and drive 
restoration projects that are more comprehensive than any one party 
or exchange can accomplish alone.155  No other markets, nationally or 
internationally, have attempted to be as comprehensive, integrated, 
and ecosystem-focused as the Willamette Ecosystem Marketplace. 
It is one thing to develop the theoretical constructs and plans for 
an ecosystem market, but the Willamette Partnership is working to 
ensure that state and federal agencies will independently approve and 
verify owners’ credits.156  Currently, pilot projects using these 
guidelines and credits are under development.157 
2.  The Freshwater Trust 
In addition to restoring streamflows as described above, The 
Freshwater Trust has developed the StreamBank program, a “web 
tool that enables landowners and restoration professionals to 
efficiently permit and fund a restoration project.”158  It aims to lower 
transaction costs by helping potentially shovel-ready restoration 
 
 153. See id. at 1. 
 154. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ORGANIZING THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLIMENTATION OF 
THE WILLAMETTE ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 1–2, available at http:// 
willamettepartnership.org/publications/MarketplacePubs/OrganizingDevelopmentandImpleme
ntationoftheWillamet....pdf. 
 155. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, DEVELOPING THE WILLAMETTE ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 15 
(2008). 
 156. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, supra note 152, at 21–24. 
 157. Willamette P’ship, Pilot Projects, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-
credit-accounting/pilot-projects (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 158. FRESHWATER TRUST, CASE STUDY 2008: STREAMBANK: RESTORATION SIMPLIFIED 4 
(2009), available at  
http://www.thefreshwatertrust.org/sites/thefreshwatertrust.org/files/pdf/StreamBank%20Case%
20Study%202008%20-%20Low%20Res.pdf. 
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projects find government funding and overcome regulatory hurdles.159  
It requires restoration professionals to answer a series of project-
specific questions, which StreamBank then matches with a “science-
based prioritization scheme” and criteria for agency and private 
funding sources.160  The web tool can also generate a budget and fill 
out permitting forms.161  Once a project is underway, the StreamBank 
program helps fund monitoring and reporting.162  In 2007, three pilot 
projects were processed in this system with another 17 initiated in 
2008.163  By creating such efficiencies, the Freshwater Trust should be 
able to meet more demand and at lower costs to both providers and 
purchasers of mitigation projects. 
III. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. Market Development Requires Experimentation 
In science, experimentation begins with a hypothesis, followed by 
controlled situations that can measure the effect of one variable on 
another.  In the realm of policy development, experimentation often 
takes the form of pilot projects.  In the previous section, we discussed 
a variety of Oregon market experiments for carbon dioxide, water 
quantity, water quality, and land.  While each example teaches us 
something new about structuring ecosystem markets, the greatest 
lesson may be recognition of the value of experimentation in 
developing fully functioning markets.  Oregon is a fairly small state 
which makes it a good testing laboratory where people can and do 
learn from one another.  Market experiments can demonstrate 
technical, social and political feasibility.  Theories that a project will 
restore ecological services, that creating markets will maximize 
ecological gains for the lowest economic costs, or that buyers and 
sellers will actually enter new markets, require confirmation before 
they can be expanded.  Experiments demonstrate whether projects 
will or will not be feasible in practice. 
 
 159. Id. at 6 (reporting on a survey that found “26% of restoration professionals’ workdays 
are spent securing permits or funding”). 
 160. Id. at 7. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 8, 11–24 (overview and details of 2008 projects). 
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1.  Developing Supply and Demand 
Markets cannot exist without willing buyers and sellers.  
Successful pilot projects can generate sufficient supply and demand to 
build markets, both for the specific currency traded and for the use of 
ecosystem service markets generally.  Potential sellers of ecosystem 
services are land and resource owners, farmers, and even 
conservation organizations that generate credits by conserving, 
restoring, or creating ecosystem goods on their lands.164  Potential 
buyers of ecosystem services can be regulated entities required to 
offset unavoidable ecological damages, voluntary buyers who want to 
invest in environmental restoration in high priority areas, or 
governments purchasing credits to support cost-effective 
conservation.165 
If an ecosystem market generates revenue for sellers, it 
encourages other sellers to enter the market and grow markets with 
credit-generating potential.  For new suppliers to enter the market, 
they must not only see the potential for economic gains, they must 
also be convinced that transaction costs of financing, permitting and 
legal uncertainty do not outweigh the benefits.  Even if they value 
conservation, only demonstrable, long-term, stable, and certain 
rewards will encourage landowners to encumber their land with long-
term commitments.  This was the problem with the DRC/Climate 
Trust Riparian Reforestation Project.  The Climate Trust and the 
DRC expected to be able to create and sell $780,000 in carbon offsets 
through a riparian reforestation project when they began the project 
in 2002.166  By 2008, only $233,333 of credits had been sold.167  Many 
private landowners were unwilling to sign 50-year conservation 
easements for the restored riparian areas.168 
The Climate Trust was able to build carbon-offset markets in 
Oregon and elsewhere by using the Oregon statutory offset mandate 
to provide start-up funds.169  This allowed it to hire the staff needed to 
 
 164. Willamette P’ship, Sellers: Who Are They?, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
key-marketplace-participants/sellers-of-ecosystem-services (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 165. Willamette P’ship, Buyers: Who are they?, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
key-marketplace-participants/buyers-of-ecosystem-services (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 166. Press Release, Climate Trust et al., The Climate Trust Awards Contract to the 
Deschutes Resources Conservancy to Capture Atmospheric Carbon through Riparian 
Reforestation (Aug. 7, 2002), available at  http://www.climatetrust.org/ 
pdfs/The%20Climate%20Trust-Deschutes%20Press%20Release.pdf. 
 167. The Climate Trust, supra note 16. 
 168. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003. 
 169. See supra notes 15–16 and associated text. 
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buy carbon offsets and participate in international carbon markets.170  
They expanded the market by reaching beyond companies required 
to buy offsets for their Oregon power plants to others who voluntarily 
wanted to offset their carbon emissions, expanding the demand for 
the credits.171  Bonneville Environmental Foundation has built its 
portfolio by promoting voluntary purchases of ecosystem services, 
first by selling consumers “Green Tags” alongside products that 
would fund renewable energy172 and more recently by selling water 
restoration certificates.173  The DRC started its market-based 
streamflow restoration work by investing its limited federal funds to 
buy or lease water for instream use from willing sellers, only later 
developing water banks to meet groundwater mitigation 
requirements.174  In each of these cases, non-profit organizations 
started markets by purchasing ecosystem services from willing sellers 
to create the demand necessary to stimulate landowners to become 
sellers and suppliers of ecosystem credits. 
Oregon’s experiments in ecosystem service markets demonstrate 
the importance of early adopters in the diffusion of innovation.175  
Clean Water Services is a large municipal wastewater and stormwater 
agency with a strong technical and policy staff.176  Its board is the 
elected county commission.177  Its longtime general manager served on 
the board of the Willamette Partnership and other basin-wide 
 
 170. See Climate Trust, supra note 15 (showing Climate Trust’s history); Climate Trust, 
Offset Quality Initiative & National Policy, http://www.climatetrust.org/oqi_national.html (last 
visited June 8, 2010). 
 171. See CLIMATE TRUST, CUSTOMIZED VOLUNTARY OFFSET PROGRAMS, available at 
http://www.climatetrust.org/documents/REV.9crxBUSINESSFLYER.pdf; Climate Trust, 
Voluntary Offset Work, http://www.climatetrust.org/voluntaryOP.html (last visited June 8, 
2010). 
 172. See BONNEVILLE ENVTL. FOUND., GREEN TAGS—A NEW WAY TO MARKET 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 11 (2004), available at http://www.b-e-
f.org/lib/pdf/BEF_new_re_product.pdf (reporting BEF’s first Green Tag transaction began in 
2000). 
 173. Bonneville Envtl. Found., Introducing BEF Water Restoration Certificates (Jul. 29, 
2009), http://www.b-e-f.org/blog/?p=1256 (last visited June 8, 2010) (announcing start of water 
restoration certificates in July 2009). 
 174. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003. 
 175. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS (1962). 
 176. Clean Water Servs., Departments, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/AboutUs/ 
Departments/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010); Clean Water Servs., Your Clean Water 
Utility, http://www.cleanwaterservices.org/AboutUs/OurStory/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 
2010). 
 177. Clean Water Servs., Your Clean Water Utility, supra note 176; Washington County 
Ore., Board of Commissioners, http://www.co.washington.or.us/BOC/ (last visited June 6, 2010). 
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restoration initiatives.178  It had the resources and patience to pursue a 
new integrated NPDES permit, serving now as a model for similarly 
situated organizations.179  In the Klamath Basin, it was only after the 
founders of the KBRT demonstrated on their own property that they 
could reduce irrigation, change grazing practices, and stay in business 
that other landowners were willing to sign up for the program.180  The 
DRC took several years to move beyond small, voluntary water 
leasing programs to robust water banking after landowners realized 
they could help restore streamflows and still have sufficient water to 
grow crops and operate irrigation districts.181 
Market experimentation can also build supply and demand by 
demonstrating economic feasibility.  Economic feasibility concerns 
the cost-benefit analysis of each restoration or conservation project.  
Pilot projects create opportunities for credit-generating banks and 
land managers to invest in conservation and to demonstrate whether 
their financial projections were accurate, thereby improving the 
financial certainty for future projects.  One of The Climate Trust’s 
first carbon projects involved paying the City of Portland to establish 
a website for commuters to arrange their own carpools.182  While it 
clearly appeared to The Climate Trust to be a promising venture, 
after they spent $120,000, expecting to offset 70,000 metric tons of 
carbon dioxide over ten years, the project generated only 3,075 tons 
of reductions in the first five years.183  This was not a failure of science, 
but an estimation failure of the demand for carpooling and the costs 
of overcoming the public’s lack of enthusiasm for the service.  
Whether it was a result of a miscalculation or over-exuberance, it is 
unlikely that The Climate Trust will soon repeat such a risky and 
uncertain investment. 
 
 178. Willamette P’ship, Board of Directors and Staff, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
about-us/board-of-directors-and-staff (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 179. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text. 
 180. Staff Report to KBRT Advisory Board, Fort Klamath, Oregon (2002). 
 181. Deschutes River Conservancy, Accomplishments, http://www.deschutesriver.org/ 
About_Us/Accomplishments/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010) (showing water transfers, 
conservation, and leases accelerating in 2002, fully six years after DRC’s founding). 
 182. Climate Trust, Internet-Based Carpool Matching, http://www.climatetrust.org/ 
carpool_match.html (last visited June 6, 2010); CarpoolMatchNW, http:// 
www.carpoolmatchnw.org (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 183. TODD WYNN, CASCADE POLICY INST., MONEY FOR NOTHING: THE ILLUSION OF 
CARBON OFFSETS 18–20 (2009), available at http://www.cascadepolicy.org/pdf/env/ 
Climate_Trust_Audit_021009.pdf. 
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Publicized successes with experimental markets increase 
acceptance for markets providing ecosystem services, increasing the 
likelihood that buyers, sellers, and the public will demand policies 
that include valuing and paying for ecosystem services.  All of the 
organizations in Oregon that are working to develop ecosystem 
markets make a point to publicize their work so that potential buyers 
and sellers are aware of the opportunities markets provide.  Effective 
methods range from the webinars on new requests for proposals 
hosted by The Climate Trust to tried-and-true field trips hosted by 
KBRT, the Freshwater Trust, and the DRC. 
Pilot projects also produce educational opportunities to inform 
the public about the value of ecosystem services.  If through these 
experiments conservationists and governments can emphasize the 
many ways nature sustains and enriches well-being, conservation may 
be more broadly supported.184  When minimizing and mitigating 
impacts on ecological services and using best ecological practices in 
land management are viewed as moral imperatives and mutually 
beneficial activates, rather than regulatory requirements and trade-
offs between environmental and economic or social needs, then 
buying and selling ecological services may be pursued more broadly. 
2.  Building Institutional Capacity 
Markets require certain fundamentals to function, such as 
recognized property rights to exchange, a legal ability to transfer the 
property rights, accounting systems and market makers (the people or 
entities that bring buyers and sellers together).  Oregon’s experiments 
in developing ecosystem service markets have benefited enormously 
from the non-profit entities described above.  The Climate Trust, 
EcoTrust, BEF, KBRT, OWT, and the DRC have all advocated for 
laws and policies needed for markets and served as market makers. 
The first requirement for any market is that the “good” being 
bought and sold be recognized as a property interest that can be 
transferred.  The OWT and the DRC could not invest in streamflow 
restoration until Oregon state law was changed in 1987 to recognize 
instream water rights and allow traditional surface water rights to be 
acquired and transferred to instream use.185  The Climate Trust and 
Ecotrust had to define what counted as a carbon offset for their 
purposes in a way that comported with a variety of young and 
 
 184. Paul R. Armsworth et al., Ecosystem Service Science and the Way Forward for 
Conservation, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1383, 1383 (2007). 
 185. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
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evolving requirements.186  The credit or property interest being 
exchanged also needs to fit the particular marketplace.  For example, 
when the OWT and the CBWTP started to acquire water rights for 
instream flow restoration, they initially tried to transfer irrigation 
rights permanently to instream use.  Farmers and ranchers generally 
were unwilling to make permanent transfers.  The markets only really 
grew when OWT and others began leasing water rights for fixed 
terms.187 
Excitement about creating more efficient mechanisms to reach 
environmental goals is often restrained by legal barriers.  Often, once 
legislatures enact laws, administrators enact policies, and bureaucrats 
enact procedures, ossification takes place until the “processes begin 
taking on the same import as the law.”188  Federal and state regulatory 
agencies have had to develop clear guidance defining mitigation 
credits under the CWA and the ESA.  This is illustrated by the CWS 
experience (under the CWA)189 and ODOT’s experience (with habitat 
mitigation banks).190  Experimenting with markets may uncover 
previously unimagined flexibility in the law and assuage fears of 
potentially expensive regulatory delays and legal challenges.  CWS, 
through its persistent work with the ODEQ and EPA, developed a 
way to meet water quality-based effluent limitations through a 
watershed-based NPDES permit.191 
Market experiments should point out where further legal or 
regulatory changes are necessary to promote functioning ecosystem 
service markets.  Experimentation can demonstrate that 
administrators are open to changing rigid processes to encourage 
flexible, outcome-based solutions, as was the case with the Oregon 
Bridge Program.  Experimentation may also demonstrate to 
regulated industries and landowners how to cooperate to achieve 
 
 186. See CLARK S. BINKLEY ET AL., AN ECOSYSTEM-BASED FORESTRY INVESTMENT 
STRATEGY FOR THE COASTAL TEMPERATE RAINFORESTS OF NORTH AMERICA 14 (2006), 
available at http://www.ecotrust.org/forestry/investment_strategy.pdf (acknowledging Ecosystem 
Forest Management will need to comply with a variety of standards, including those developed 
by the Climate Trust). 
 187. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003. 
 188. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 29. 
 189. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 190. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 191. See DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NATIONAL POLLUTANT DISCHARGE ELIMINATION 
SYSTEM WATERSHED-BASED WASTE DISCHARGE PERMIT, Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 
101144 & MS4, available at http://www.epa.gov/npdescan/OR0028118FP.pdf. 
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environmental goals at lower costs, bringing supply and demand to 
the market. 
The Oregon and Pacific Northwest non-profits have all provided 
extensive technical assistance to both buyers and sellers of ecosystem 
credits, helping them understand what carbon offsets or mitigation 
credits or instream water rights are and how they can participate in 
markets.  To some extent, they work like real estate agents, linking 
sellers and buyers, helping sellers develop transferable credits and 
providing buyers the assurance that they are getting what they pay 
for.  The Freshwater Trust’s Streambank system provides direct 
technical decision support to both buyers and sellers.192  All of these 
organizations work with buyers and sellers to take transactions 
through the wide variety of funding and permitting steps necessary to 
do transactions.  This experience is vital for market building because 
it is only by doing transactions that buyers, sellers and market makers 
gain assurance that the market works. 
3.  Building Learning Networks 
In Oregon and the Pacific Northwest, hundreds of citizens, 
agency personnel, businesses, and non-profits regularly get together 
and share what they have learned about ecosystem service markets.  
The best example of this is the well-organized group of qualified local 
organizations participating in the CBWTP.193  They meet together 
quarterly to share best practices and data and study projects on the 
ground.  The Willamette Partnership played a similar role as it 
engaged a broad variety of stakeholders in the development of its 
integrated water market.194  The Northwest Environmental Business 
Council195 regularly hosts conferences and workshops on ecosystem 
service markets.  Innovation theory emphasizes the importance of 
such learning networks or communities, and experience to date in 
Oregon bears it out.196  Key individuals and opinion leaders, who see 
 
 192. See generally, FRESHWATER TRUST, supra note 158 (showing benefits through a series 
of casestudies to sellers, e.g. landowners and restoration professionals, and buyers, e.g. local 
coordinators and grant administrators). 
 193. Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program, Partners, supra note 65 (identifying 11 
qualified local entities in Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho). 
 194. Willamette P’ship, Broad Participation, Broad Benefits, http:// 
www.willamettepartnership.org/key-marketplace-participants (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 195. Northwest Environmental Business Council, http://www.nebc.org (last visited June 4, 
2010). 
 196. See ROGERS, supra note 175. 
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how carbon and instream water markets work, promote market 
approaches to habitat and other ecosystem services. 
B. Market Development Requires Standards 
It is essential to clearly and neutrally identify and quantify 
relationships (1) between development actions and required 
mitigation or offsets, and (2) between private sector landowners’ 
restoration measures and the ecosystem services provided.  
Developing such standards for supply and demand requires advanced 
technical capabilities.  First, baselines are needed to determine what 
services are provided under existing land management practices. 
Measuring environmental degradation and the debits that must be 
compensated may be relatively straightforward.  The modeling and 
predictive ability needed to accurately develop and certify a seller’s 
ecosystem credits is more challenging.  Ecosystem service sellers will 
not manage their valuable lands for environmental services if they 
cannot be assured that they will receive credits, and the public 
interest of the trade will be lost if the ecosystem services promised do 
not materialize.  Poor outcomes are also likely to erode public 
support for future efforts.  Pilot projects, like those currently 
underway with the Willamette Partnership, are important to show 
scientific feasibility. 
Without a technical underpinning for the market, negotiations, 
auctions, and trading platforms cannot begin.  Because much of this 
technical knowledge and information technology infrastructure will 
serve both voluntary and regulatory markets, this is an important area 
for public-private partnership on financing, design and development. 
1.  Clear Property Interests 
Experimental markets should address whether markets can 
effectively identify and commoditize ecosystem services.  Are 
tradable ecosystem “currencies” adequately defined?  Developing 
measurements, definitions, and procedures should help buyers and 
sellers understand these currencies and their risks and responsibilities 
before and after a sale.  Such process manuals, currency development, 
and ecosystem measurement tools are a large aspect of the 
Willamette Partnership’s nascent “Counting on the Environment” 
program.197  Analyzing their success in developing currencies can 
begin once pilot projects are underway. 
 
 197. See supra note 150 and text accompanying notes 150–155. 
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2.  Quantification and Valuation 
Experimental markets should also demonstrate whether markets 
mechanisms are functioning, i.e., is the interaction of supply and 
demand adequately reflected in prices?198  There is no question that 
ecosystems generate service flows that can be quantified in economic 
value; what is less clear is how to create markets that will generate 
information about how much of a service needs to be protected and at 
what cost.199  In some markets that will be easier to determine than in 
others. In cap-and-trade greenhouse gas markets, the government can 
set the amount of carbon dioxide reduction necessary and then 
auction units of carbon pollution to the regulated market place.200  
The market is large with considerable supply and demand. 
In water markets, water rights are held by a limited number of 
entities and can only be traded within a particular watershed, 
resulting in much less supply and demand and far fewer transactions.  
Early on, the OWT and the DRC developed systems for evaluating 
existing water rights’ ability to restore instream flows at times and 
locations critical for aquatic habitat.201  These evaluations were 
essential for early water market development.  On paper, an existing 
water right may be for 5 cfs during the irrigation season, but it might 
not be delivered for that full amount during critical low water 
periods.202  They now have analytic tools to determine for specific 
rivers the values of how “wet” the waterway really is.203 
Early wetland mitigation banks overlooked the fact that wetland 
values can only be traded fairly once the currency’s dimensions are 
defined: which functions must mitigation replace, at what scale, in 
what locations, and for whose benefit?  Requiring wetland mitigation 
to match destroyed wetlands along numerous specific variables will 
 
 198. See, e.g., James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting 
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001) (discussing 
the lack of “direct price mechanisms to signal the scarcity or degradation of . . . public goods” in 
a typical commercial market). 
 199. Salzman, supra note 137, at 889. 
 200. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 8, at 627–28 (explaining specifically the Kyoto Protocol 
Clean Development Mechanism). 
 201. See Janet C. Neuman & Cheyenne Chapman, Wading Into the Water Market: The First 
Five Years of the Oregon Water Trust, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 135, 162–64 (1999) (explaining 
OWT’s development of measurement protocols and tools). 
 202. See, e.g., id. at 164–65 (“[N]eighboring water users are very wary of any transaction that 
simply leaves the entire amount of a water user’s right in the stream, because doing so will 
disrupt the established pattern of diversions and return flows and possibly deprive other 
irrigators of flows in the stream at certain times of year.”). 
 203. See id. at 162–64. 
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increase sellers’ and buyers’ assessment and monitoring costs and 
decrease the number of sellers who can match those functions.204  A 
prerequisite of trade is fungibility, and fungibility requires 
similarity.205  If trades do not capture the environmental and human 
values sought to be protected, those values become external to the 
exchange and cannot be assured by trading mechanisms.206  
Consequently, wetlands regulators need to choose a defensible point 
along the spectrum from a robust market in ill-defined goods to an 
anemic market in a rigorously reviewed commodity.207  Environmental 
currencies must take into account both the interests of the transacting 
parties and the externalities relevant to social welfare.208  Perhaps 
recent rulemaking acknowledging ecosystem services directly209 will 
address some previous criticisms.  But wetlands assessment 
methodologies need further testing to assure environmental 
effectiveness while avoiding raising transaction costs to levels that 
would prohibit trade.210 
Even as the new federal rule is being implemented, states may 
create their own guidelines furthering the experimentation by 
creating ecosystem services currency that retains fungibility and 
simplicity, while capturing the relevant values.  Currently, the ODSL 
looks only to geographical range, hydrogeomorphic and Cowardin 
classes, and a wetlands-type multiplier ratio to calculate trade 
mitigation credits.211  New guidance on an Oregon Rapid Wetland 
 
 204. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 612. 
 205. Id. at 611. 
 206. Id. at 624. 
 207. Id. at 612. 
 208. Id. at 668–89. 
 209. Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
19,593 (Apr. 10, 2008) (modifying 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332 & 40 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
 210. See generally, James Murphy, Jan Goldman-Carter, & Julie Sibbing, New Mitigation 
Rule Promises More of the Same: Why The New Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail To 
Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38 STETSON L. REV. 311 (2009) (finding that 
mitigation has been a repeatedly failed promise, that the new rule retains the same loopholes, 
and that the Corps failure to adequately monitor, enforce, and encourage avoidance are the 
biggest threats to wetlands); J.B. Ruhl, James Salzman & Iris Goodman, Implementing the New 
Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section 404 Compensatory Mitigation Program: A Catalyst 
For Advancing Science And Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 251 (2009) (finding that the new 
regulations acknowledge ecosystem services and move in the right direction, but that methods 
for measuring wetlands ecology, economics, and geography are not yet sufficiently robust). 
 211. Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Mitigation Bank Regions and Contact Information, http:// 
www.oregonstatelands.us/DSL/PERMITS/mitbank_status.shtml (last visited June 6, 2010); OR. 
DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING GUIDEBOOK FOR OREGON §§ 4.2.1 
– 4.2.8 (2000), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DSL/PERMITS/docs/mitbank_guidebk.pdf. 
Achterman_final_2.doc 7/17/2010  12:24:09 PM 
Summer 2010]     STATE AND REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM SERVICE MARKETS 323 
Assessment Protocol (“ORWAP”) has been released, which does not 
rely on acreage but a more sophisticated analysis of function and 
value done in term of  “grouped services” like hydrologic function, 
water quality, fish, aquatic habitat, and terrestrial habitat, rather than 
on a single generic wetlands value.212  Looking at replacing functions 
is a good start, but thinking only about functions may alter who 
benefits from the associated ecosystem services, moving wetlands 
away from urban areas and into rural ones.213  While ORWAP was 
designed mainly for developers, the Willamette Partnership’s 
crediting promotes using its Counting on the Environment methods 
to generate credits based on changes to wetland functions from an 
enhancement project and to determine priority locations for 
mitigation.214 
The Endangered Species Act generally prevents any action 
which would kill or injure a species in danger of extinction.215  This 
includes any habitat modification that leads to any death or injury.216  
Consequently, many development projects around the nation could 
violate the Act.  However, in 1982, Congress amended the ESA to 
allow the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“USFWS”) to issue permits 
for an “incidental take” of a protected species.217  To obtain an 
incidental take permit, an applicant must prepare a habitat 
conservation plan (“HCP”).218  USFWS also allows use of habitat 
credits from conservation banks as reasonable and prudent actions in 
a “section 7 consultation” in accordance with the ESA.219 
USFWS recently began promoting market-based approaches for 
mitigation requirements, conditions of particular HCP permits, which 
 
 212. OR. DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, GUIDANCE FOR USING THE OREGON RAPID WETLAND 
ASSESSMENT 
PROTOCOL (ORWAP) IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL PERMIT PROGRAMS 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.oregonstatelands.us/DSL/WETLAND/docs/orwap_guide.pdf. 
 213. Ruhl, Salzman & Goodman, supra note 210, at 262. 
 214. See generally WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, WETLAND CREDITING PROCEDURE: 
TRANSLATING FUNCTIONAL SCORES TO CREDITS ACCOUNTING (2009), available at http:// 
www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/orwap/WetlandCreditingProcedur
e_071309.pdf. 
 215. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2006). 
 216. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.21, 17.3. 
 217. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 1418 
(1982); 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). 
 218. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 219. U.S DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, GUIDANCE FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT, USE, AND OPERATION OF CONSERVATION BANKS 3–4 (2003), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/pdfs/MemosLetters/conservation-banking.pdf. 
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include the use of habitat conservation banks.220  Conservation banks 
are parcels of land that are conserved and managed in perpetuity for 
conservation of the specified listed species.  Such banks allow 
investors to assemble and restore prime habitat for endangered 
species to create “credits” that can be sold to developers who must 
mitigate habitat destruction as part of their HCP permit conditions or 
as an action required due to consultation under section 7 of the 
ESA.221  In this market system, voluntary sellers hope to create 
marketable credits that can be sold at a profit to buyers, who seek to 
purchase credits for less than the cost of alternative mitigation and 
avoidance approaches.  Federal agencies believe this will help 
assemble large permanently dedicated conservation sites with 
professional management.222  As with wetlands banking, difficulties 
arise in trying to quantify habitat currencies for both restoration 
benefits and development impacts. USFWS plans to make mitigation 
credits available based on “habitat value conservation outcomes” and 
to encourage active management.223 
Conservation banking for endangered species is at an early 
development stage in most places, although California has used them 
since the late 1990s.224  ODOT created Oregon’s first conservation 
bank to mitigate impacts of its bridge program on two endangered 
plants, Cook’s lomatium and the large-flowered woolly meadowfoam, 
as well as the threatened vernal pool fairy shrimp, a small, translucent 
crustacean.225  These species live in vernal pool habitat—small, 
shallow wetlands that fill with water during fall and winter rains and 
dry up in the spring and summer.226  These wetlands are very rare in 
Oregon and throughout the nation. 
 
 220. Id. at 7. 
 221. See J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management: Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. 21, 43 (2005). 
 222. Id. at 44. 
 223. Amy J. Dona, Note, Crossing the Border: The Potential for Trans-Boundary 
Endangered Species Conservation Banking, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 655, 670–72 (2008). 
 224. See DOUGLAS P. WHEELER & JAMES M. STROCK, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
OFFICIAL POLICY ON CONSERVATION BANKS (1995), available at http://www.ceres.ca.gov/ 
topic/banking/banking_policy.html; see also Fred Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second 
Nature” of Wetlands, 39 ENVTL. L. 577, 580 (2009). 
 225. Scott Learn, ODOT Preserves Green Spaces to Offset Road-Building Damage, THE 
OREGONIAN (Jul. 2, 2009), available at http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/index.ssf/ 
2009/07/odot_preserves_green_spaces_to.html; see also supra notes 144–145. 
 226. See id. 
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In addition to being the first conservation bank in the state, the 
ODOT bank addresses wetland impacts.227  Federal and state agencies 
collaborated to make sure that approval of ODOT’s conservation 
bank was subject to only one set of standards and procedures. This 
substantially reduced the time and effort spent having the bank 
approved and was an important factor in ODOT’s willingness to 
become Oregon’s pioneer conservation banker.228  ODOT’s relatively 
new MCBRT is attempting to meet mitigation needs by working with 
the Willamette Partnership.229  The Willamette Partnership has 
developed a credit calculator for upland prairies230 that could generate 
credits to mitigate impacts to the endangered Fender’s blue butterfly 
as part of a regional HCP.231 
3.  Additionality and Multi-Credit Accounting 
In order for markets to work, buyers and sellers of services must 
understand the rules that apply.  This requires ecosystem service 
markets to define terms important to their growth.  Additionality is 
the concept that credited ecosystem improvements must “represent 
an overall increase in, or a [measurable] avoided reduction of, 
ecosystem services, relative to those services that would have existed 
without creating the credits.”232  Obviously, landowners should not be 
able to generate salable credits for practices they were already 
undertaking or required by existing law to perform.  Additionality has 
been an issue in many of the Oregon markets.  For example, under 
the DRC/Climate Trust Riparian Reforestation project, the question 
arose as to whether a forest landowner required to retain trees in 
riparian areas under the Oregon Forest Practices Act233 should be 
allowed to sell offsets based on the carbon sequestered by those trees.  
The answer to that was “no,” but credits could be created by 
reforesting denuded riparian areas.234 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. OR. DEP’T OF TRANS., supra note 139, at 22. 
 230. PAUL ADAMUS, PROCEDURE FOR UPLAND PRAIRIE CREDIT CALCULATOR (2009), 
available at  http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ecosystem-credit-accounting/prairie/Upland 
PrairieMetricProcedure_071409.pdf. 
 231. Willamette P’ship, Upland Prairie Habitat, http://www.willamettepartnership.org/ 
ecosystem-credit-accounting/upland-prairie-habitat (last visited May 12, 2010). 
 232. Willamette P’ship, A Glossary of Important Terms, http:// 
www.willamettepartnership.org/ about-markets/glossary (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 233. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 527.610 to .785 (2009). 
 234. Climate Trust, Deschutes Riparian Reforestation, http://www.climatetrust.org/ 
deschutes.html (last visited June 7, 2010). 
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A subcategory of additionality is financial additionality.  This 
refers to the ability of an ecosystem service seller “to demonstrate 
that absent payments for credits the benefits of the action that 
generated the credits would not have exceeded the costs.”235  If a 
practice is independently economically valuable, such as a forester 
who plants trees for future harvest, it is argued that the practice 
should not generate ecosystem service credits.236  Credits should be 
generated only when they truly provided the financial incentive to 
undertake the action.  This issue also arose on the Deschutes 
Riparian Reforestation project.  Participating landowners were 
required to grow trees longer than they normally would have in order 
to qualify for credits.237 
Defining the difference between credit stacking and double 
dipping raises similar problems, especially for multi-credit markets.  
Credit stacking involves creating multiple, different types of 
ecosystem credits from the same geographical area, such as a parcel 
of land that contains both wetlands credits and habitat credits.238  
Double dipping occurs when a single output generates multiple 
credits—such as a created wetland that generates wetland mitigation 
credits, water quality credits, carbon sequestration credits, and 
habitat conservation credits.  The difference between credit stacking 
and double dipping is subject to a debate between accounting for all 
of the benefits of an ecosystem service and awarding a windfall to the 
parcel without any extra investment.239   Multiple credits from one site 
may be justified if calculated together, as is being done by the 
Willamette Partnership240 and the Oregon Bridge Program.241  
Unbundling and valuing separable functions of an ecosystem is not 
necessarily different from what real estate appraisers often do.  What 
is important to keep in mind is the underlying objective of payments 
for ecosystem services: providing incentives for environmental 
investment that would not otherwise exist.  Unless landowners are 
able to bundle the value of multiple credits, it may not be worthwhile 
 
 235. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 95, at  30. 
 236. See id., but see Sean Casten, Does Additionality Matter, GRIST (Mar. 27, 2008), available 
at http://www.grist.org/article/carbon-policy-details-part-2. 
 237. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003. 
 238. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 95, at  30. 
 239. See Alice Kenny, When is Credit-Stacking a Double Dip?, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 
(Nov. 16, 2009), available  at http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/ 
article.page.php?page_id=7147. 
 240. See generally WILLAMETTE PARTNERSHIP, supra note 151. 
 241. INST. FOR NAT. RES., supra note 128, at 19–20. 
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for them to invest in the environmental restoration needed to create 
the credits. 
While recognizing the importance of defining key concepts, 
terms, and measurements so that credit purchasers and sellers can 
make equivalent trades, it is important not to mistake this for a need 
for global uniformity.  Uniform federal or global standards are 
neither necessary nor appropriate in many markets.  Ecosystem 
services often will require markets that are custom-designed for the 
particular participants and localities.  The diversity of ecosystem 
services and types demands a diversity of standards and tools to 
measure and analyze those standards.242  Standards must vary to 
match the type and scale of the market—public versus private, large 
basin versus small watershed, prairie versus wetlands.  Ecotrust and 
the Climate Trust participate in international carbon markets 
complying with the rules and regulations that have been developed 
for them.243  Groups like KBRT, CWS, the Freshwater Trust, and the 
DRC operate in local markets, each with its own standards. 
4.  Geographic Scale 
Geographic scale influences ecosystem service market 
development in several ways beyond market size.  Clearly, a global 
carbon market is more likely to develop than a global habitat market 
for a highly localized, rare species.  A less obvious geographic scale 
issue relates to the potential misalignment of buyers and sellers.  For 
example, if development impacting wetlands occurs primarily in 
urbanizing areas, like Oregon’s Willamette Valley, and the 
landowners interested in creating wetlands mitigation or restoration 
banks are in rural areas with limited hydrologic or biological 
connection to the impacted wetlands, the resulting mitigation banks 
are unlikely to create ecosystem services equivalent to those 
displaced.  This is why ODSL is now promoting development of 
mitigation banks in rapidly developing areas.244 
 
 242. The Ecosystem-Based Management Tools Network website lists over 160 tools for 
managing coastal and marine resources. Ecosystem-Based Mgmt. Tools Network, EBM Tools 
Database,  http://www.smartgrowthtools.org/ebmtools/index.php (last visited May 12, 2010). 
Their list represents only non-terrestrial land use applications and is not even exhaustive of all 
such tools in this category. Ecosystem-Based Mgmt. Tools Network, About EBM Tools, 
http://www.ebmtools.org/about_ebm_tools.html (last visited May 12, 2010). 
 243. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 244. Personal conversation between the author and DSL Director, Louise Solliday, Fall 
2009, Salem, Oregon. 
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Closely related to geographic misalignment of buyers and sellers 
are the problems posed by determining the appropriate market area 
for a mitigation or conservation bank.  For example, in the Deschutes 
Groundwater Mitigation program, determining the “zone of 
influence” within which credits must be obtained was a contentious 
issue.245  Under federal wetland mitigation bank guidance, the same 
issue arises in defining appropriate geographic service areas.246 
Geographic scale also has important implications in terms of 
ecological effects of the mitigation or conservation actions.  Those 
entering the market as sellers, particularly at the early stage of market 
development, often do not own property where the most critical 
ecological resources are located.  For example, the DRC started its 
water-leasing program with any landowner willing to lease water 
instream just to get water rights holders used to leasing their rights.247  
The early leases were not prioritized or evaluated in terms of their 
impact on aquatic ecological function.248  With the development of the 
CBWTP, this changed, and all water acquisitions were prioritized and 
evaluated.249  Biodiversity conservation must occur at the landscape 
scale, yet market participants do not always align with landscape-scale 
conservation priorities.  Adoption by all 50 states of formal State 
Wildlife Conservation plans250 should help address this problem. 
C. Market Development Requires Accountability 
Demonstrating feasibility requires information.  During 
individual ecosystem service projects, data should be gathered about 
ecological benefits and the economic and operational systems needed 
for the market to function.  When pilot projects are in the 
experimental phase, there are great opportunities for rigorous 
monitoring, but too often monitoring and data gathering are skipped.  
Yet, if more data is generated, pilot markets can be refined, and 
accounting and measurement systems can be improved. 
Ecosystem market standards should not only facilitate trading, 
but they also should incorporate relevant values and be enforced to 
 
 245. See Pagel, supra note 55, at 30. 
 246. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 
60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,611 (Nov. 8, 1995). 
 247. Personal experience of the author as Director of the DRC from 2000 to 2003. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66, at 3. 
 250. See State Wildlife Action Plans, http://www.wildlifeactionplans.org/ (last visited June 7, 
2010). 
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make certain the promised environmental benefits materialize.  
Overly simple (or inaccurate) currencies ignore a primary goal of 
environmental legislation: to force entities to internalize their 
externalities.251  Externalities are the cost or benefits imparted to 
parties that are not directly involved in a transaction as a seller or 
buyer. 252  A common theme in ecosystem services markets is that 
private uses—those subject to controlled distribution, exclusion, and 
scarcity—allow for the easy determination of price and automatically 
create a dynamic market, while public uses—those which are often 
not excludable or rival—are often plagued by positive externalities 
that are not easily captured by market signals and are ignored unless 
government intervenes.253  If trades ignore or oversimplify the social 
costs imposed, these criteria will not be preserved.  The public and 
environmental NGOs should expect trades to include meaningful 
ecosystem functions, to be subject to objective and meaningful 
monitoring and transparent data collection about trades, and to 
reassess their goals continually to assure they are being met.254 
These concerns for standards that further the public interest have 
been partially addressed in Oregon by the nature of the entities 
establishing the markets.  Many of the pilot Oregon markets are 
being initiated by environmental organizations, not by the regulated 
entities.255  The Freshwater Trust and the DRC are staffed by people 
who passionately care about using markets to achieve environmental 
 
 251. Although environmental economics is now a robust discipline, the first generation of 
United States environmental legislation was not based on economic theories and feasibility 
studies, but rather commands to industries to curb activities that threatened human health and 
the environment based on far-reaching public sentiment.  Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of 
America and the Graying of United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental 
Law's First Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 77–80 (2001). 
 252. The most salient externality is pollution, where neither the purchaser of the final 
product nor the producer who sells it directly pays for the pollution costs to health and 
environment imposed on society.  Ecosystem services, on the other hand, are often positive 
externalities: the benefits they produce, e.g. photosynthesis or flood control, cannot readily be 
sold on the market.  J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND 
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 65 (2007). 
 253. Id. at 64-65. 
 254. See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 680. 
 255. The Climate Trust, Ecotrust, The Freshwater Conservancy, DRC, KBRT, BEF, and 
Willamette Partnership all are, or began as, private entities based on environmental concern.  
Even those organizations that started by governments or regulated entities, e.g. Bonneville 
Power Administration, and Clean Water Services, partner with environmental nonprofits.  See 
supra Part II. 
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goals.256  The Willamette Partnership’s protocols directly incorporate 
a “conflict of interest” check.257  As the government steps up its role 
to homogenize and formalize environmental service market 
standards, it must assure that the public interest continues to be met 
in those markets.  This will require transparency of data collection, 
credit generation, and accounting.  Government run or imposed 
markets also should include requirements for ongoing independent 
verification that the credits that are promised materialize.  NGOs 
should continue to play a role in the generation, verification, and 
oversight of such credits.  Lastly, governments should create 
procedures that allow NGOs and the public to challenge transactions 
that are fraudulent or detrimental to public interest and to hold 
legally responsible parties accountable. 
The amount and type of monitoring and evaluation done on the 
Oregon projects has varied.  The ODOT Bridge Program had its 
results reviewed independently by Oregon State University to 
evaluate its strengths and lessons learned and retained an 
independent third party to prepare a cost-benefit analysis of the 
program.258  ODEQ has reviewed the Tualatin River NPDES permit 
that it issued to Clean Water Services.259  The CBWTP was evaluated, 
as a program, by a third-party professional evaluation firm whose 
report was peer-reviewed by an academic panel.260  Ecotrust and The 
Climate Trust both require independent third party monitoring of 
projects that create carbon offsets.261  The DRC has even paid for 
stream-gauging stations to assure that the water it leased actually was 
 
 256. Clicking through to the biographies of lead staff shows decades of environmental 
nonprofit experience.  See Freshwater Trust, Staff, http://www.thefreshwatertrust.org/who-we-
are/staff (last visited June 6, 2010); Deschutes River Conservancy, Staff, 
http://www.deschutesriver.org/About_Us/Staff/default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 257. WILLAMETTE P’SHIP, ECOSYSTEM CREDIT REGISTRY CONFLICT OF INTEREST CODE 
(2008), available at http://www.willamettepartnership.org/tools-templates/ 
wp_conflict_of_interest_code.pdf. 
 258. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128. 
 259. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, WATER QUALITY CREDIT TRADING IN OREGON: A 
CASE STUDY REPORT (2007), available at http://www.deq.state.or.us/wq/trading/docs/ 
wqtradingcasestudy.pdf. 
 260. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66; GAIL ACHTERMAN, SUSAN HANNA & 
NOELWAH NETUSIL, REPORT TO THE NORTHWEST PLANNING AND CONSERVATION COUNCIL 
ON THE EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE COLUMBIA BASIN WATER TRANSACTIONS PROGRAM 
(2007), available at 
cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/library/documents/CBWTP report Tech Committee FINAL .doc. 
 261. CLIMATE TRUST, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2006), available at http:// 
www.climatetrust.org/pdfs/Climate_Trust_Annual_Report_2006.pdf. 
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in the stream reach that it was intended to benefit.262  It is important 
to note a distinction between monitoring and evaluation.  Market 
makers or regulators need to monitor to make sure that specific 
projects are delivering the credits they have sold.  They also need to 
evaluate their overall market programs to make sure the anticipated 
system-level results are being achieved. 
D. Government Agencies Can Generate Demand 
1.  The Government as Standard Setters and Regulators 
Because ecosystem services are often defuse, invisible, 
probabilistic, and non-subtractable, private demand is difficult to 
generate.263  In theory, there is potential private demand for such 
traditionally public goods—e.g., flood insurance providers investing in 
water-storing forests264—but such demand has not yet materialized.  
Government’s main role has been to require private entities to 
purchase mitigation.  This role is vital, as demonstrated by the 
creation of The Climate Trust in response to Oregon’s cap on carbon 
dioxide emissions, the DRC’s groundwater mitigation bank in 
response to state rules requiring offsets for all new groundwater 
withdrawals, and creation of wetland and habitat mitigation banks.  
Without the imposition of mitigation requirements by state and 
federal agencies, markets are less likely to develop. 
2.  The Government as a Buyer of Services 
State and federal governments can purchase ecosystem credits 
directly in order to meet their own conservation and mitigation 
objectives, thereby creating demand.  Such government actions have 
been instrumental in developing ecosystem markets in Oregon and 
other states in the Pacific Northwest.  The Bonneville Power 
Administration, through its funding of the Columbia Basin Water 
Transaction Program,265 has become the primary buyer of streamflow 
restoration.266  In doing so, it has used markets to meet its fish and 
wildlife mitigation obligations.  ODOT has performed a similar role 
 
 262. See Neuman, supra note 37, at 454 (purchasing a flow meter to gauge Evan’s Creek 
instream water right lease). 
 263. See John Harte, Land Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity: The Challenge of 
Preserving Earth's Life Support System, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 929, 951–52 (2001). 
 264. Salzman, supra note 137, at 894. 
 265. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 266. See HARDNER & GULLISON, supra note 66, at 32–35. 
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by using wetland and habitat banks to mitigate for the impacts of its 
highway and bridge construction projects.267  Experience to date 
suggests that other agencies may be able to achieve their conservation 
objectives cost effectively through the use of ecosystem service 
markets, even in situations where they are not mitigating for the 
impacts of their own activities. 
E. Government Agencies Can Convene Market Drivers and Facilitate 
Market Development 
Accounting systems and standards are unavailable for many 
ecosystem services.  Even where accounting systems and standards 
exist, such as in wetlands mitigation, disagreements remain about how 
they should be applied.  Little institutional capacity exists to get 
ecosystem markets started.  Experience in Oregon and the Pacific 
Northwest suggests that government agencies can play the important 
role of convener, making sure all stakeholders are heard and that 
policy questions are addressed.  Government agency participants can 
provide important scientific expertise, data, and conservation 
priorities to all participants.  State and federal agencies have played 
this role in virtually all of the ecosystem service markets in Oregon 
and the Northwest.  Their deep engagement in and commitment to 
the Willamette Partnership is probably the best example of this role. 
Pilot programs are essential,268 but their usefulness is tempered if 
their lessons are only learned locally.  EPA, the Corps, USFWS, 
National Marine Fisheries Services, and the Federal Highway 
Administration should all serve as sources of best practices, project 
successes and failures, and up to date scientific information.  Larger 
governments are integrative and have a greater capacity to hire 
researchers, write reports, synthesize data, and transfer lessons 
learned from local areas to broader regions. 
The Oregon Bridge Program and the Clean Water Services’ 
NPDES permit demonstrate another key role of government agencies 
in ecosystem service market development.  If market approaches are 
to be usable within existing regulatory systems, a great deal of 
interagency work will be needed to align requirements under various 
laws and regulations.  ODOT and CWS were able to convene all of 
 
 267. See supra Part II.D.2. 
 268. See supra Part III.A. 
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the necessary agencies and facilitate interagency agreement on how 
ecosystem service markets could be used.269  
F. Markets Can Streamline Development and Restoration 
The large number of state and federal resource agencies often 
leads to compartmentalization, with agencies working only in their 
own silos and looking at only the resource they manage.  State and 
federal agency coordination is critical to developing markets to 
support high priority environmental restoration. ODOT’s Bridge 
Program demonstrates this principle especially well.  Interagency 
coordination was not created overnight.  It began with the formation 
of the Collaborative Environmental and Transportation Agreement 
for Streamlining (“CETAS”) in 2001.270  This agreement represents a 
partnership of six Oregon agencies with six federal agencies actively 
working to improve interagency cooperation, protect the 
environment, and create programmatic approaches to comply with 
environmental statutes.271  Within the partnership, ODOT was able to 
develop a Comprehensive Mitigation and Conservation Strategy that 
foresaw the need for performance standards, identifying mitigation 
obligations, finding priority restoration areas, and establishing 
assessment protocols.272  The Federal Highway Administration’s 
“Eco-Logical” program recommends all states engage in similar 
integrated planning and coordination as a prerequisite to developing 
other environmental programs and ecosystem service credits.273  
Without clear, agreed-upon ecosystem-restoration goals, there are 
fewer opportunities to regulate development, to mobilize state 
funding, and to direct public and private sector investment.  But 
through interagency partnership, developed at the outset, a strategic 
focus and priorities emerged.  Only from a foundation of shared 
priorities and a continued commitment to consultation and 
participation of all stakeholders can an effective ecosystem service 
market emerge. 
 
 269. See Or. Dep’t of Transp., CETAS Streamlining, http://www.oregon.gov/ 
ODOT/HWY/GEOENVIRONMENTAL/cetas.shtml (last visited June 6, 2010). 
 270. See id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., COMPREHENSIVE MITIGATION/CONSERVATION STRATEGY 
(CMCS) WHITE PAPER 3-4 to 3-5 (2004), available at ftp://ftp.odot.state.or.us/techserv/Geo-
Environmental/Environmental/Procedural%20Manuals/Wetlands/Wetlands%20Manual/01-
White%20paper.pdf. 
 273. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., ECO-LOGICAL: AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO 
DEVELOPING INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 9–17 (2006). 
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Complex agency-by-agency permitting leads to costly, time-
consuming, and uncertain processes for developers, while adding to 
the cost and time required for restoration and other credit generating 
projects.  This increased time leads to increased costs and uncertainty 
for both parties.  As the Freshwater Trust discovered, a sizeable 
portion of restoration professionals’ time is spent securing permits 
and funding.274  Credit purchasers often prefer to contribute more 
funds to restoration, over and above minimum mitigation 
requirements, in exchange for expedited, outcome based permits.  
This is what ODOT agreed to in the Bridge Program, and it achieved 
the anticipated results—better environmental outcomes with 
significant cost savings through expedited permitting.275 
IV. OREGON’S LATEST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES EXPERIMENT: 
SENATE BILL 513 
Oregon is committed to keeping up its momentum as a leader in 
developing ecological service markets.  Experiments to date 
demonstrate that these markets can lead to better environmental 
outcomes at a lower cost to business and conservation organizations.  
At the December 2007 Oregon Business Summit, business and 
government leaders explicitly adopted an Ecosystem Services 
Marketplace Initiative.276  It seeks to build and expand markets for 
carbon, wetlands, habitat, open space, and hazard reduction and to 
develop an integrated ecosystem services marketplace.277  In 2008, two 
workshops were held in Portland to start laying the foundation for the 
initiative.278  At the first workshop, ecosystem practitioners, state 
government representatives, and ecosystem service experts from 
other states participated in a brainstorming session on desired 
outcomes, market barriers, roles and responsibilities of government, 
and policy reforms needed to stimulate an ecosystem marketplace in 
Oregon.279  A second workshop brought the results of the first 
workshop to state agency heads and staff who explored policies and 
action strategies needed to bring the integrated marketplace to 
 
 274. FRESHWATER TRUST, supra note 158, at 6. 
 275. GAINES & LURIE, supra note 128, at 44–46. 
 276. See OR. BUSINESS PLAN, CREATING AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICES MARKETPLACE (2007), 
available at http://www.oregonbusinessplan.org/pdf/EcosystemServicesMarketplace.pdf. 
 277. Id. at 1. 
 278. INST. FOR NATURAL RES., supra note 95, at i. 
 279. Id. 
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fruition.280  The two workshops culminated with a report, “Policy 
Cornerstones and Action Strategies for an Integrated Ecosystem 
Marketplace in Oregon,” recommending Oregon legislation to 
further the development of Oregon’s ecosystem marketplaces.281 
The 2009 Legislative Assembly took the bold step of 
affirmatively recognizing ecosystem services by passing Oregon 
Senate Bill 513 (S.B. 513).282  S.B. 513 declares it “the policy of the 
state to support the maintenance, enhancement, and restoration of 
ecosystem services throughout Oregon, focusing on the protection of 
land, water, air, soil, and native flora and fauna.”283  The bill 
anticipates that valuing ecosystem services will help landowners 
diversify their incomes and help Oregonians enjoy enhanced health 
and quality of life.284 
S.B. 513 “encourages” state agencies “to adopt and incorporate 
adaptive management mechanisms” and to “use ecosystem services 
markets as a means to meet mitigation needs.”285  The act requires 
that “[w]hen a state agency adopts a strategy or a decision that calls 
for the mitigation of potentially adverse environmental consequences, 
[it] must consider mitigation strategies that recognize the need for 
biological connectivity and appropriate mitigation.”286  Neither 
“biological connectivity” nor “appropriate mitigation” are defined in 
the Act,287 and agencies are not explicitly directed how or when to 
weigh these factors.  But it is significant that the legislature has 
empowered and encouraged all Oregon agencies to consider 
ecosystem services approaches and adaptive management. 
Recognizing that developing ecosystem services markets will 
take ongoing efforts by many agencies, non-profit organizations, and 
 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 22–25. 
 282. S.B. 513, 75th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009).  This bill was sponsored by Oregon 
State Senators Devlin and Atkinson and Oregon State Representatives Garrett and Gilliam and 
signed by Governor Kulongoski; it was proposed by Defenders of Wildlife and was supported 
by the Willamette Partnership, Oregon Homebuilders Association, The Nature Conservancy, 
Oregon Forest Industries Council, Oregon Business Council, Ecotrust, Sustainable Northwest, 
Wildlands Inc., Parametrix, Clean Water Services and the City of Portland.  Sara Vickerman, 
Ecosystem Markets Legislation: Oregon Approves Path-Breaking Legislation, 449 OR. INSIDER 
17 (August 2009), available at http://www.oregonwaterquality.com/Insider%20Issues%20449-
452.html. 
 283. Or. S.B. 513 § 2. 
 284. Id. §§ 3(1), (4). 
 285. Id. § 4. 
 286. Id (emphasis added). 
 287. See id. § 1 (defining terms). 
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businesses, and that more research is needed to make ecosystem 
service markets work well, S.B. 513 directs the Oregon Sustainability 
Board to convene an “ecosystem working group.”288  This working 
group is composed of representatives from local, state, and federal 
agencies; Indian tribes; conservation organizations; developers; and 
landowners from the private sector who are “active in improving the 
ecological effectiveness of ecosystem services markets”289 and will 
prepare a report and policy recommendations for the 2011 
legislature.290  Specifically, the working group is expected to suggest to 
the legislature overarching goals for ecosystem service markets, 
methodologies to quantify ecosystem goals, ecological evaluation and 
accounting systems, the appropriate role of government participation, 
and the regulatory and voluntary policies required to stimulate 
demand for ecosystem services payments.291 
S.B. 513 represents the start of the next phase of Oregon’s 
experimentation in ecosystem service markets.  It convenes all the 
different players in market development to address past barriers to 
market development and figure out how to develop integrated 
markets.  It goes beyond policies of “no net loss” to recognize that 
some degraded ecological systems need restoration.292  S.B. 513 
recognizes some of the greatest challenges facing policy makers, from 
establishing consistent methodology standards293 to the appropriate 
role of government participation.294  Explicit recognition of these 
policy issues also demonstrates an understanding of just how much 
needs to be done—in law, science, economics, and policy—and just 
how great the opportunities are for ecosystem service markets’ 
growth.295 
V. CONCLUSION 
States can play an important role in ecosystem service market 
development.  Oregon’s experience in the 1990s with markets for 
 
 288. See id. § 5(1)(a). 
 289. Or. S.B. § 5. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. § 5(2). 
 292. See id. § 2. 
 293. Id. § 5(2)(c). 
 294. Id. § 5(2)(e). 
 295. The ongoing efforts of the ad hoc and working groups can be seen on the Oregon 
Watershed Enhancement Board’s website. Senate Bill 513 Ecosystem Services Markets 
Working Group, http://oregon.gov/OWEB/SB513.shtml (last visited Jun. 23, 2010). 
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carbon offsets and instream water rights laid the foundation on which 
the Willamette Partnership and The Freshwater Trust have 
developed more comprehensive, market-based environmental 
restoration approaches.  S.B. 513 institutionalizes Oregon’s 
commitment to continued experimentation and pioneering efforts.  
Future success will depend upon continued collaboration between 
private organizations and state and federal agencies to create the 
institutional capacity to support market-based methods.  To assure a 
robust marketplace that functions to the benefit of the environment 
and humanity, the government must assure clear standards, 
accountability, and scientific and technical expertise are provided to 
participants in ecosystem services markets. 
